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Broadly defined, affirmative action encompasses any measure that allocates goods – 
such as admission into universities, jobs, promotions, public contracts, business loans, and 
rights to buy and sell land – on the basis of membership in a designated group, for the purpose 
of increasing the proportion of members of that group in the relevant labor force, 
entrepreneurial class, or university student population, where they are currently 
underrepresented as a result of past or present discrimination
1. These measures go beyond 
antidiscrimination policy strictly conceived. Their existence may result from constitutional 
mandates, laws, administrative regulations – such as requirements on public contractors –, 
court orders or voluntary initiatives. Their goal is to counter deeply entrenched social 
practices that reproduce group-structured inequality even in the absence of intentional 
discrimination. 
  Beyond this most general definition, affirmative action policies vary substantially 
across countries, regarding the identification of their intended beneficiaries, the form of the 
programs involved (quota/non-quota), the level (constitutional, legislative, administrative) of 
the legal norms from which they derive, and their domain of implementation.  
  As for the first of these parameters, the most common categories are ethnic, national, 
or racial groups held to be economically or socially disadvantaged, aboriginal peoples, 
women, people with disabilities, and war veterans
2. But this pattern is by no means universal. 
While affirmative action policies for women has been a major issue in the United States, they 
are only beginning to take up in India – mostly in the field of political representation
3 –, and 
are not even considered in Malaysia. Religion, not covered by legislation in Britain, has the 
most extensive legislative coverage in Northern Ireland, with specific provisions for 
affirmative action in favor of the Catholic minority. Most important, the term « affirmative 
action  » also applies to cases in which a politically dominant majority group introduces 
preferential policies to raise its economic status as against that of an economically more 
advanced minority, as in Malaysia and – more recently – South Africa. Here, the groups that 
receive the benefits of affirmative action are the ones that have the power to legislate them
4. 
                                                 
1 Weiner (1983). 
2 On the specific case of veterans in the United States, see Skrentny (1996), at 41-45. 
3 Tawa-Lama (2002); Tawa-Lama (2001). 
4 In Malaysia, such policies deal with the Bumiputras (« sons of the soil ») who comprise 66 percent of the 
estimated 22.2 million population, while the Chinese are 25.3 percent, and the Indians 7.4 percent (Treasury, 
Economic Report 2000). In South Africa, aside from women, the main beneficiaries of affirmative action are 
Africans (76.7 percent of the approximately 40.5 million population, according to the 1996 census) and mixed-
race people (« coloureds ») (8.9 percent). Other examples where preferences favor politically dominant groups 
include Nigeria (Hubbell (1990)), Sri Lanka (Sowell (1990), at 41-89), and Fiji (Howard (1991)). In Nigeria, 
affirmative action was designed to reduce the predominance of non-northerners – mostly Ibos – in coveted jobs 
in the north, with preferences in education and public employment spreading from the northern regional 
government to the federal government. In Sri Lanka, the 1956 law making Sinhalese the only official language 
throughout the island (Official Language Act, No. 33) – eventually nullified by the 1987 13
th Amendment to the 
Constitution – had the effect (and the purpose) of closing the many job opportunities in the government and in 
the professions that education in the English language had opened up for the better -educated, economically 
successful Tamil minority (about 20 percent of the population). Besides, between 1971and 1977, a new 
«standardization » policy was implemented, which ensured that the number of students qualifying for university 
entrance from each language group was proportionate to the number of students who sat for university entrance 
examination in that language. As a practical matter, this meant that Tamil-speaking students had to score much 
higher than Sinhalese-speaking students to gain admission to universities.   2
  The specific – more or less rigid – requirements imposed by affirmative action 
programs and their legal underpinnings are also different from one country to another. Thus, 
at first sight, one could contrast experiences with constitutionally sanctioned, mandatory 
quota/reservation policies such as those in Malaysia and India with non-constitutionally-
grounded « goals and timetable » policies to be found in North America
5. This connection, 
however, does not always hold: while South African affirmative action policies are 
constitutionally sanctioned, they set up supposedly flexible « goals », not quotas. Besides, 
even within the group of countries where affirmative action is not constitutionally mandated 
(the US and Canada, but also all European countries), institutional differences are not 
insignificant. To take but one example, in contrast to the US system where affirmative action 
(for federal contractors and subcontractors) was introduced by Presidential Executive Orders 
and its limits are left for the courts to define, in Canada there is detailed legislation that 
specifies the scope of the policy
6.  
Finally, the range of the programs involved also varies across countries. Thus, while in 
the United States, Canada, South Africa, Australia and Northern Ireland, affirmative action 
programs tend to cover both the public and the private sectors, in India, the entire sphere of 
private employment is excluded from reservations. On the other hand, besides quotas in 
admission into colleges, medical and engineering schools, government employment and 
public enterprises, a predefined proportion of seats in Parliament and state legislatures are 
also reserved for « Scheduled Castes » and « Scheduled Tribes », a scheme the equivalent of 
which does not exist in most other «  affirmative action  » countries
7. As for preferential 
policies in higher education – a prominent element in the affirmative action debate in the 
United States, India and Malaysia –, they are almost non-existent in Europe
8.  
  As far as employment, university admissions and public contracting are concerned, 
affirmative action policies may be divided into two different kinds of programs. For the sake 
of simplicity, let us consider the example of employment in the US context, assuming 
(unrealistically) that it can be defined as a zero-sum game between two racial groups (blacks 
and whites). In that case, one first kind of «  affirmative action  » may simply consist in 
measures designed to increase the pool of black applicants, by running job advertisements in 
                                                 
5 In Latin America, most countries do not have affirmative action programs of any kind, and civil rights law is 
generally underenforced. Besides, « the few countries with enabling statutes have tended to focus on criminal 
law provisions as the primary vehicle for combating acts of discrimination, in part because the criminal law 
venue does not require an investment of financial resources on the part of the victim » (Kateri Hernandez 
(2002), at 1129). 
6 Indeed, the Canadian 1986 Federal Employment Equity Act outlines the departure from the principle of equal 
treatment inherent to affirmative action more explicitly than any US statute or regulation : « The purpose of this 
Act is to achieve equality in the workplace so that no person shall be denied employment opportunities or 
benefits for reasons unrelated to ability and, in the fulfilment of that goal, to correct the conditions of 
disadvantage in employment experienced by women, aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities and members 
of ‘visible minorities’ by giving effect to the principle that employment equity means more than treating persons 
in the same way but also requires special measures and the accommodation of differences » (at 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/E-5.401/48801.html). 
7 On the efforts to create political districts in which a majority of the eligible voters are ethnoracial minority 
group members capable of electing minority candidates to state, local and federal offices in the United States, 
see Kousser (1999). Another exception is New Zealand, where the descendants of the aboriginal Maori 
population are guaranteed five seats in Parliament. Thus, there are five Maori districts that overlay the general 
election districts. To vote in one of these Maori districts, a Maori voter must register on the Maori roll. 
Registration on this roll is optional, however; Maori can choose to register in the general election instead (see 
generally Fleras and Spoonley (1999)). 
8 For a narrowly limited exception, see Sabbagh (2002). In the United States, these programs might look all the 
more acceptable as « admission to leading American colleges and universities, in particular the private 
institutions that form a large part of the college and university system, is not determined exclusively by tests or 
academic achievement » (Glazer (2000), at 146).   3
black newspapers or by setting up special training programs in areas where blacks are heavily 
concentrated
9. This type of affirmative action, also known as « outreach », does take race into 
account, but in a rather limited way: race is allowed to enter the picture only within the 
preliminary process of enlarging the set from which individuals will eventually be selected, 
not at the selection level itself. However, in other affirmative action programs, the recruitment 
process is entirely permeated by color-consciousness, even during the final, decision stage. 
«  Affirmative action  » then refers to measures that grant a more or less flexible kind of 
preferential treatment in the allocation of scarce resources to the members of groups formerly 
targeted for legal discrimination
10. The phrase « preferential treatment » should not be 
understood as having any negative implication. It simply identifies a situation where, for 
example, a black applicant, B1, would be selected for a job in spite of there being at least one 
white applicant whose qualifications were deemed to be « higher », « higher » meaning that if 
another black applicant, B2, had come up with exactly the same qualifications as the white 
one, the employer would have hired him, instead of B1
11. In other words, racial identification 
is the key factor here: B1 succeeds in obtaining the job that he applied for – and would have 
failed but for his being identified as black. Because this definition of affirmative action brings 
into relief the main subject of political and legal controversy, it will serve as a starting-point 
for the developments that follow
12. 
                                                 
9 See Glazer (1975), at 196-197. 
10 This is not meant to suggest that the « outreach » variety of affirmative action has no preferential component 
whatsoever. As a practical matter, the fact of specifically devoting resources to setting up training programs 
designed to reach the members of designated groups will reduce the amount of resources available for setting up 
training programs that might have targeted other groups. To a certain extent, there is also a zero-sum-game 
involved. The difference is that in one case, the goods that are being preferentially allocated are in fact resources 
– namely the probability of being in a position to participate in a training program that might open new job 
opportunities –, whereas in the other case, the goods are the jobs themselves. In short, affirmative action may 
operate either at the level of the final distribution of goods or at the level of the distribution of other resources 
that might prove instrumental in securing those goods through a competitive and supposedly meritocratic 
selection process (at least as far as jobs and university admissions are concerned). 
11 See Nagel (1977), at 3. « Qualifications » are the relevant informational data that one will take into account in 
order to predict the level of job performance that each applicant can be expected to reach. It is worth 
emphasizing that this definition of « preferential treatment » does not imply that the methods currently used by 
firms and universities to assess the applicants’ « qualifications » are indeed optimal – or even adequate. 
12 In Europe, with the exception of gender quotas in representative assemblies (see Siim (2000), and more 
generally Caul (2001); Matland (1998)), almost all affirmative action policies are of the « outreach » variety. 
The United Kingdom is a case in point – although there are substantial differences between Britain and Northern 
Ireland. In Britain, the law permits, but does not require, special actions to aid minority group members. Under 
the 1976 Race Relations Act, employers are allowed to specially encourage racial minorities to apply when they 
are underrepresented in the workforce (RRA, pt.6, sec. 38), and they may grant « persons of a particular racial 
group access to facilities or services to meet the special needs of persons of that group in regard to their 
education, training or welfare, or any ancillary benefit » (RRA, pt. 6, sec. 35). Most important, the law permits 
employers to grant « only those … employees working at that establishment who are of a particular racial group 
access to facilities for training which would help fit them for that work » (RRA, sec. 35, pt. 38). On the other 
hand, using differential standards to benefit minority groups is called « positive discrimination » and is explicitly 
forbidden. There are no requirements for government to do business with minority-owned enterprises, and no 
required record-keeping of a firm’s employment of minorities, as exist in Canada, South Africa and the United 
States. While the Race Relations Act – in contrast to the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 – exceptionally permits 
the use of race when it can be shown to be a genuine occupational qualification in relation to the performance of 
a particular job (for instance, « when the holder of the job provides persons of that racial group with personal 
services promoting their welfare, and those services can most effectively be provided by a person of that racial 
group » (RRA, pt. 2, sec. 5)), the courts have interpreted this « genuine occupational qualification » provision 
narrowly, and it did not open the door to stronger types of affirmative action. In a nutshell, « positive action » 
did not lead to preferential treatment – despite substantial inequalities in labor market outcomes between the 
various ethnic and racial groups. To take but one example, in 1996, the unemployment rate for nonwhite males 
was 19 percent compared to 9.1 percent for white males, and for nonwhite females, 15 percent compared to 5.9   4
  Unsurprisingly, the broadest and most radical kind of affirmative action is to be found 
in countries where the groups who stand to benefit from the programs involved form a 
numerical majority holding political power, namely Malaysia and South Africa. These 
specific cases will be considered first. Since there is much more reliable empirical evidence 
available on the United States than on any other country, the next section assessing the effects 
of affirmative action policies in employment and university admissions will mostly focus on 
the US experience – with an aside on France as an interesting point of comparison. This will 
lead to a more general evaluation of the different conceivable justifications for such 
programs. Lastly, the central problem of delineating the groups targeted for favorable 
treatment will be approached through an analysis of the Indian case, in which it was – and 
remains – particularly salient. 
 
 
Preferential Treatment for Disadvantaged Majority Groups: 
Malaysia and South Africa 
 
 
Beyond their obvious differences as far as colonial legacy is concerned, these are two 
cases in which not only were the disadvantaged groups numerical majorities, but the extent of 
economic group inequalities was especially impressive. Thus, in 1957 – the year Malaysia 
became independent –, while the Malays made up 62.1 percent of agricultural workers, they 
comprised only 4.3 percent of architects, 7.3 percent of engineers, and 6.8 percent of 
accountants
13. That same year, Malay business constituted only 10 percent of the 89,000 
registered business establishments and accounted for only 1.5 percent of the capital invested 
in registered companies
14. In South Africa, in 1995, whites, constituting 12.9 percent of the 
population, had 58.6 percent of total personal income, whereas Africans – who made up 76.2 
percent of the population – received 29.3 percent of income share
15. In 2000, according to one 
                                                                                                                                                         
percent for white females (Jain, Sloane and Horwitz (2003), at 65). Among the main factors accounting for this 
absence of preferential treatment, one should rather emphasize the importance of demographics : in contrast with 
the United States, where about 30% of the population identify themselves as members of ethnoracial minorities 
(according to the Census 2000 figures, there are now 12.3 percent blacks, 12.5 percent Hispanics, 3.6 percent 
Asians and 0.9 percent Native Americans), in Britain, as of 1994, 93 percent of those in the General Household 
Survey identified themselves as white (Teles (2001), at 248). Aside from their low numbers, minorities are also 
distributed rather evenly across a number of groups that do not see themselves as having much in common 
(Indians are the largest group, followed by Afro-Caribbeans, Pakistanis, African Asians (largely refuges from 
Uganda and Kenya), Africans, Chinese, and Bangladeshis ; see Jones (1996), at 23; Modood and Berthoud 
(1997), at 13). Unlike in the United States, there is no leading minority group whose historical experience of 
discrimination would be acute enough for them to obtain special treatment – thus paving the way for a 
generalized affirmative action regime. Moreover, activists’ efforts to popularize the term « black » as an 
umbrella for Africans, African Caribbeans, and South Asians have failed. On the other hand, in Northern 
Ireland, continued violence and persistent discrimination on a religious basis led to the 1989 Fair Employment 
Act, which was consciously modelled, in a way that the Race Relations Act was not, on some aspects of 
contemporary US practice. Thus, all public authorities and private sector employers with more than ten 
employees are required to register with the Fair Employment Commission – now the Equality Commission – and 
submit annual reports on the religious composition of their workforce. Large employers are required to collect 
similar information on applicants as well (McCrudden (1992), at 171). Unlike the experience in mainland UK 
where positive action remains voluntary, when the workforce is unbalanced, the employer is under an obligation 
to implement a program of affirmative action. For more details on Britain and Northern Ireland, see Teles (2001) 
and Teles (1998) – from which this development derives. 
13 Brown (1994), at 218. 
14 Lim (1985), at 256. 
15 Van der Westhuizen (2002), at 127.   5
survey of 161 large firms employing 560,000 workers, whites made up 80 percent of 
managers still
16. The racial wage differential was also substantial: at the end of the 1990s, the 
average wage of a white worker was five times as great as the average for an African, 
although half of that discrepancy was explained by differences in education and location
17. 
Thus, the sheer size of the existing inequalities was a powerful argument for the introduction 
of affirmative action policies, whose existence was to be guaranteed in the Constitution itself. 
In Malaysia as well, not only does Article 8(5) of the Federal Constitution of 1957 
state that the general principle of equality does not ban provisions for the advancement of 
Malays; in line with the compromise eventually reached wherein non-Malays, in return for 
receiving citizenship based on the principle of jus soli, agreed to having special rights 
conferred on the Malays in order to uplift their economic position, Article 153 explicitly 
recognized the Malays and the Indigenous people of Sarawk and Sabah as endowed with 
certain protected privileges designed to help them enter into the modern sectors of the 
economy and to attain economic parity with non-Malays. In particular, it was stipulated that 
the government should reserve for the Bumiputras a reasonable proportion of positions in the 
public service
18 and educational institutions, scholarships, and business permits or licenses. 
Article 89 also empowered state authorities to reserve areas of land for exclusive Bumiputra 
ownership provided that they were not already occupied by non-Bumiputras
19. Last but not 
least, these Malay special rights could not be amended through the normal legislative process, 
and their existence could not even be questioned  : under the 1948 Sedition Ordinance – 
eventually incorporated into the Constitution in 1971 –,  to do so constituted  a criminal 
offence
20. In South Africa, no similar provision exists, but Section 9 (2) of the Bill of Rights 
inserted in the 1996 Constitution states in part: «To promote the achievement of equality, 
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken ». Affirmative action in hiring, 
promotion, university admissions, and the award of government contracts is specifically 
mentioned
21 
  In both countries, the constitutionalization of affirmative action has probably 
facilitated its radicalization. In Malaysia, in line with the demographic shift that saw the 
                                                 
16 Of these managers, 79 percent were male and 21 percent female. Two years earlier, in 1998, the percentages 
of blacks, coloureds, and Indian were 6, 4, and 4, respectively, with 86 percent white managers (see Jain, Sloane 
and Horwitz (2003), at 35); in 1995, according to the University of Cape Town’s Graduate School of Business 
bi-annually published Breakwater Monitor, the proportion of black managers in the private sector amounted to 
about 4 percent of the total (Adam (1997), at 233). 
17 Schultz and Mwabu (1998). 
18 In the Malaysian Civil Service (MCS), for instance, the goal defined thereafter called for a recruitment ratio of 
4 Malays to every non-Malay. As a matter of fact, the « Malayanization » of the MCS proceeded quickly. In 
1957, expatriates constituted 61.7 percent of the MCS, Malays 34.6 percent and non-Malays 3.6 percent; by 
1970, there were no expatriates, Malays formed 86.6 percent and non-Malays 13.4 percent (Lim (1985), at 256-
257). 
19 Nesiah (1997), at 201. That provision only expanded a pre-independence policy set up by the British colonial 
administration; as soon as 1913, the Malay Reservation Enactment was passed which designated certain areas to 
be reserved for Malay ownership only. Yet, by preventing Malay reserve land from being sold to non-Malays, 
that supposedly « protective » legislation restricted Malay access to capital. Moreover, since only a limited 
number of agencies could hold Malay reserve land, it also meant that prices would always be defined below 
market value. 
20 Jain, Sloane, and Horwitz (2003), at 184. 
21 See generally Cédiey (2002). Section 9 (3) also indicates that « the state may not unfairly discriminate directly 
or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language 
and birth » (our emphasis). Section 9 (5) makes clear that, in some cases, discrimination may be  considered 
« fair ».   6
Malay population expanding and Chinese numbers contracting as a result of Singapore’s 
departure from the federation of Malaya in 1965, and as a response to the severe interethnic 
rioting of 13 May 1969
22, in 1971, the government launched a « New Economic Policy » 
(NEP) designed to ensure that the distribution of the workforce in each economic sector 
should reflect the ethnic composition of the population. The avowed objective was «  to 
eradicate poverty among all Malaysians and to restructure Malaysian society so that 
identification of race with economic function and geographical location is reduced and 
eventually eliminated, both objectives being realized through rapid expansion of the economy 
over time »
23. The project of bringing about a radical, large-scale social transformation which 
arguably underlies affirmative action policies even in liberal democracies
24 was thus made 
strikingly – and most unusually – explicit. As a practical matter, the NEP consisted in a set of 
policies reflecting a complete departure from the laissez-faire economic model that had 
guided development since independence  and geared towards forcing the private sector to 
increase Bumiputra participation, in addition to the public employment reservations already 
mandated by the Constitution : the government has legislated Malay quotas for the issuance 
of trading/business licenses and permits and ownership of equity  ; it provides special 
assistance such as credit
25, training, and business sites to Malay businessmen; it undertakes 
responsibility to acquire shares in private corporations on behalf of Bumiputras, with a view 
to reaching an objective of 30 percent Bumiputra corporate ownership. These programs are 
virtually unique to Malaysia
26. Last but not least, the National Language Act of 1967 
designating Malay to be the sole official language – with English-medium schools converting 
to the Malay medium three years later – also had a major impact on employment in the public 
sector, where the requirement of Malay proficiency both eased and legitimated Malay 
                                                 
22 In the official – generally acknowledged to be understated – figures, 196 people died, 439 were wounded, and 
9,143 were arrested (Wyzan (1990), at 53). 
23 In Nesiah (1997), at 203 (our emphasis). The clustering of the different ethnic groups in specific occupational 
areas was indeed remarkable, with Chinese concentrated in urban commerce and in tin-mining communities, 
Indians in rubber plantation labour, and Malays in the rice-farming peasantry (by 1957, 97.5 percent of rice 
farmers were Malays; 66 percent of individuals employed in commerce and 72 percent of those in mining and 
manufacturing were Chinese (Brown (1994), at 218)). The meaning of « geographical location » in the quotation 
above refers to Bumiputra overrepresentation in the rural areas and non-Bumiputra domination of the urban, 
industrial, and mining centres. Apparently what is desired is not so much the redistribution of the races between 
the different states or provinces as redistribution between urban and rural areas, i.e., in effect, a large measure of 
rural-urban migration of the Bumiputra population. As for the spatial distribution of the Chinese population, it is 
such that their influence cannot be confined to certain regions by any scheme of devolution or regional 
preferences: they are spread in substantial numbers over all the states of the Malaysian federation except the 
remote north-eastern states of Trengannu and Kelantan (Nesiah (1997), at 99). 
24 On the United States, see Koppelman (1996), at 24-27; Sabbagh (2003a), at 314-319. 
25 Initially, in August of 1974, banks were required to provide at least 12 percent of their loans to Bumiputras; 
this was raised to 20 percent in October 1976 (Lim (1985), at 263). 
26 In South Africa, the Black Economic Empowerment Commission has recently proposed further legislation to 
increase control of both companies and productive land by black individuals until it attains proportions similar to 
those defined in the Malaysian case (25 percent and 30 percent respectively): see Jain, Sloane and Horwitz 
(2003), at 210. Yet, the particular sectors in which the « black » conglomerates are most active so far (finance, 
insurance, tourism, the leisure industry, media and publishing...) tend to be typical knowledge-intensive, post-
Fordist industries, with limited potential to create massive job opportunities. « Whereas these are undoubtedly 
the necessary sectors upon which South Africa should focus in order to gradually reduce its heavy reliance on 
primary commodity exports and enhance its position in the new International Division of Labor, growth in these 
sectors is likely to favor a highly skilled, mostly male, and therefore mobile elite, rather than the mass of 
unskilled and unemployed » (van der Westhuizen (2002), at 143). In short, the pressures for globalization 
severely constrain the state’s ability to pursue a joint strategy of growth with ethnic redistribution.   7
preferential employment, restricting the upward mobility that English had afforded to many 
non-Malays in the past
27. 
  Did the NEP succeed in attaining its quantitative goals? By all measures, advances 
made by the Bumiputras in the fields of education, employment, occupational mobility, and 
ownership of small businesses and large corporations have been substantial. Thus, the 
percentage of Malays in the student population of local universities rose from 40 per cent to 
73 per cent between 1970 and 1980
28. The mean household income of Malays went from 43.7 
percent of the Chinese (national) mean in 1970 to 55% in 1995
29. In private sector 
employment, the Malays exceeded the initial 50 percent target, reaching 61.8 percent by 1990 
in the professional and technical categories
30. They also improved their representation in the 
administrative and managerial occupational groups from 22.4 percent in 1970 to 31.3 percent 
in 1990 – even though their targeted representation level was 49.3 percent
31. While the 
Malays had 2% equity in firms in 1969, in 2000, they owned 22% of their national Economic 
Assets
32. As for the ultimate end of creating a harmonious and unified society – assuming that 
end is being pursued at all –, success is definitely more doubtful
33.  
South African affirmative action, as defined in the 1998 Employment Equity Act 
(EEA), also displays some radical features compared to the programs set up in most other 
countries. Indeed, not only does the law stipulate that « every designated employer must, in 
order to achieve employment equity, implement affirmative action measures for people from 
designated groups (...) [in order] to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational 
categories and levels of the workforce »
34, but it explicitly includes include « preferential 
                                                 
27 Grove (1986). 
28 Lim (1985), at 269. 
29 Wyzan (1990), at 55; Yusof (2001), at 91. This reflects not only the impact of preferential policies but also the 
increased urbanization of the Malays over these years – rising from 27 percent urban in 1970 to 37 percent 
urban in 1985 – and the declining proportion of Chinese in the Malaysian population (Sowell (1990), at 50). 
30 Jain, Sloane, and Horwitz (2003), at 16. 
31 Hodges-Aeberhard and Raskin (1997). 
32 Jain, Sloane, and Horwitz (2003), at 43. As soon as 1982, the process of Malaysianization of the primary 
sector was nearly complete, with Malays controlling about 60 percent of corporate shares in mining and 
plantations through state enterprises, far beyond the original target of 30 percent set for both sectors in 1973 
(Jesudason (1989), at 91). Yet, in other fields, it has been argued that a substantial percentage of Malay 
businessmen resell their licenses to non-Malays for a lucrative fee or allow their names to be used as fronts for 
non-Malays who actually operate the business: see Bakri Musa (1999), at 187-188. 
33 Gomez and Jomo (1997), at 168. In particular, educational opportunities for non-Malays, particularly at the 
college level, have shrunk so much as a result of the 55 percent Bumiputra quota that an increasing proportion of 
Chinese students are forced to attend universities in other countries such as Singapore. Thus, as soon as 1980, 
nearly 40,000 students from Malaysia were studying overseas, three-fifths of them Chinese. By 1985, there were 
approximately 60,000 students from Malaysia studying overseas – as many as were enrolled in degree programs 
in Malaysia itself (Sowell (1990), at 50). In 2003, in order to counter this depletion of human capital, a merit-
based enrolment system was finally introduced in all public colleges and universities. 
34 Employment Equity Act, No.55 of 1998, Sections 13 (1) and 13 (2). A « designated employer » is : 
•  an employer who employs fifty or more employees.  
•  an employer who employs fewer than fifty employees, but has a total annual turnover that is equal to or 
above the applicable annual turnover of a small business.  
•  a municipality or an organ of state, excluding the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence 
Agency and the South African Secret Service.  
•  an employer appointed as a designated employer in terms of a binding collective agreement and to the 
extent provided for by that agreement. 
 
People from « designated groups » are : 
•  « black people », a generic term meaning Africans, Coloured and Indians ; 
•  women ; 
•  people with disabilities.    8
treatment and numerical goals »
35 – though not quotas. Moreover, in contrast with most other 
national legislations where the issue of fair pay is usually addressed in relation to women 
rather than people of color, the prohibition of « indirect discrimination »
36 enacted through 
the 1998 law covers the area of remuneration for both groups. Section 27 of the Employment 
Equity Act thus requires employers to submit, in their employment equity plan, data on 
compensation and benefits received for each occupational category (and level) by race and 
gender
37. Where disproportionate income differentials exist, the employer must take measures 
to progressively reduce them. Finally – and most distinctively –, under Section 20 (5) of the 
Act, a designated group member’s lack of the necessary qualifications is not a sufficient 
reason for hiring a non-designated group member instead: the employer « may not unfairly 
discriminate against a person solely on the grounds of that person’s lack of relevant 
experience »
38. As far as the law is concerned, what matters is only the applicant’s « capacity 
to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the job »
39. By wholeheartedly rejecting 
the very criterion of merit as conventionally defined by the current level of qualification, 
South African law thus embraces the principle of affirmative action most explicitly, while 





The US Experience: The Historical and Legal Background 
 
   
  Like in Malaysia and South Africa, US affirmative action programs were originally 
predicated upon the existence of multidimensional, far-ranging, intergenerational patterns of 
group inequality between the two numerically predominant ethnoracial groups – whites and 
blacks. Although these inequalities have significantly subsided over the past three decades, 
they have not disappeared. Thus, in 1997, the median household income for blacks was only 
64% of the corresponding figure for whites
41. The percentage of households earning less than 
$10,000 per year was 17 percent for blacks, and 5.3 percent for whites
42. The discrepancy in 
the assets detained by black and white households is much higher still: here, the ratio is about 
                                                                                                                                                         
(Employment Equity Act, No.55 of 1998, Section 1 - Definitions). 
35 Employment Equity Act, No.55 of 1998, Section 15 (3).  
36 See below, at 11. 
37 Yet, as far as employment itself is concerned, the EEA does not require companies to disaggregate their 
information on race and disability by gender – and vice versa. This presents the possibility that targets for 
women will be met mostly by advancing the already privileged white women, thereby denying black women 
access to training and traditionally male jobs. In addition, companies below the threshold limit of fifty 
employees are not covered by the EEA. Thus, since the vast majority of African women work either in such 
small companies or as domestic workers – or in the informal sector –, most of them will remain uncovered by 
the legislation (Samson (1999). On the related unfairness of excluding Asians as a whole from affirmative action 
programs in university admissions in the United States resulting from a similar failure to take into account the 
internal diversity of the group involved, certain fractions of which – defined by national origin – are indeed 
underrepresented in selective universities, see Brest and Oshige (1995), at 855-856. 
38 Employment Equity Act, No.55 of 1998, Section 20 (5). 
39 Id. 
40 For a more detailed analysis of the 1998 Employment Equity Act, see Cédiey (2001). 
41 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1999, Washington, D.C., U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1999, at 478 (table 750). That discrepancy is due mostly to the high proportion of single-parent, female-
headed families within the black population (48 percent of black households in 2000).  
42 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1999, at 478 
(table 749).   9
one-to-ten
43. The unemployment rate among whites was 4.2% in 2001; it was 8.7% among 
blacks
44. In 2000, 7.5% of non-Hispanic whites lived in poverty; for blacks, the figure was 
22.1%
45. And one could add many other examples
46.  
  In the United States, however, the very existence of affirmative action policies is 
somewhat paradoxical. For not only did Congress fail to provide such policies with a 
constitutional foundation ; it also passed a law – the 1964 Civil Rights Act – which did seem 
to exclude them in advance. Now covering private employers with fifteen or more employees, 
federal, state, and local governments, educational institutes, employment agencies and labor 
unions
47, that statute prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national 
origin, and sex
48. One of its key provisions was its «  Title VII  », which declared it «  an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer (...) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual (...) because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin »
49. 
Obviously, the phrase « any individual » meant that even though the motivating force behind 
the introduction of the 1964 Civil Rights bill was most certainly to end the discrimination 
suffered by blacks – which was then pervasive, particularly in the South –, whites would also 
be protected from employment discrimination. This had been endlessly reiterated by the 
leading supporters of the bill, such as Senator Humbert Humphrey:  
 
« Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is nothing in it that 
will give any power to the Commission [enforcing Title VII] or to any court to require 
hiring, firing or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial « quota » to achieve 
a certain racial balance. That bugaboo has been brought up a dozen times; but it is 
nonexistent. In fact the very opposite is true. Title VII prohibits discrimination »
50. 
 
                                                 
43 Oliver and Shapiro (1995), at 197; Conley (1999). 
44 U. S. Department. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002, at 368 
(table 562). 
45 U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Poverty in the United States: 2000, at 291 (table A). 
46 See generally Cherry and Rodgers (2000); Cole (1999); Miller (1996). 
47 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which extensively amended the 1964 Act, reduced the 
number of employees necessary for its application from twenty-five to fifteen. It also extended it to state and 
local governments and gave the agency responsible for its enforcement – the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) – the power to file suits in its own name, along with private action. 
48 The inclusion of women among the groups to be protected by the 1964 Civil Rights Act was an accident of 
politics. As a matter of fact, the term « sex » was added to the legislation in an effort to defeat it. The 
amendment was introduced by Representative Howard Smith, a senior Southern Democrat who assumed that the 
inclusion of « sex » among the forbidden categories would render the bill impassable. His assumption was that 
banning sex-based discrimination would be such an obviously absurd decision that a bill including that provision 
would necessarily be rejected: see United States. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, The Legislative 
History of Titles VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Washington, D. C., U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1968, p. 3213, 3222. 
49 The entire text is as follows : « It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer :  
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin ». (Civil Rights Act (1964). 42 U. S. Section 2003, § 703 (a)). 
50 Congressional Record, 88th Congress, 2d session, 1964, 110, part 5, p. 6549.    10
Besides, another section of the law explicitly disavowed the notion that the Civil 
Rights Act could require any preferential treatment to correct statistical imbalances. Thus, 
Section 703 (j) stated:  
 
«  Nothing contained in this title [Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any 
employer (...) to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because 
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin of such individual or group on account of 
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of 




  Yet, the first affirmative action programs were to be implemented only a few years 
later, in spite of that seemingly unambiguous commitment – and in spite of their persistent 
unpopularity with a substantial majority of the American public
52 –, through an administrative 
and legal process on which a few comments are in order. 
  From the point of view of the agencies charged with monitoring the implementation of 
Title VII – the abovementioned EEOC and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance 
(OFCC) –, the individualized approach to antidiscrimination enshrined in the Civil Rights Act 
had many disadvantages. First, the practice of investigating each case separately soon proved 
inadequate given the unexpectedly high number of complaints received by the EEOC, of 
which the agency was able to handle only a very small proportion. Second, the burden of 
proving the employer’s discriminatory intent was almost impossible to meet. Third, the 
enforcement mechanisms were often unable to reach the employers most egregious for their 
discriminatory practices: the fact that hardly any black worker would bother to apply for a 
position in such firms anyway allowed them not to become the subjects of complaints, 
thereby making it impossible for the EEOC to start an investigation.  
  In order to solve the most pressing problem – that of overwhelming caseload –, the 
EEOC eventually resorted to the technique of « class-action suits »
53. Instead of squandering 
its meagre resources by undertaking time-consuming and cumbersome investigations the 
impact of which was to be restricted to one single individual, the agency chose to focus on a 
few large firms, in hope that the courts would prescribe compensatory racial quotas in case of 
previous discrimination – which they did
54–, whether these quotas were to benefit the actual 
victims of such discrimination or not. For although the official mission of the EEOC was to 
stop discrimination, the new antidiscrimination law was generally expected to result in greater 
numbers of employed African-Americans
55. In this light, insofar as improving black 
employment through the elimination of discrimination could be conceived as the ultimate 
raison d’être of the agency, it was natural to expect that this same standard – the proportion 
of blacks in the workforce – would be used for assessing EEOC achievements. Forcing the 
employers to set up « goals and timetables » to increase minority representation, then, would 
                                                 
51 Civil Rights Act (1964). 42 U. S. Section 2003, § 703 (j)). 
52 Sniderman and Carmines (1997); Steeh and Krysan (1996). 
53 See Fiss (1996). 
54 The set of remedial measures that the courts would be entitled to impose on those employers held to be guilty 
of persistent discrimination in violation of Title VII had been left undefined. Judges were simply invited to 
« order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or 
hiring of employees, with or without back pay (...) or any other equitable relief that the court deems 
appropriate » (U.S. Congress, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, section 706 (g)). Words in italics are those 
that Congress added in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, mostly in order to legalize some of the 
first affirmative action programs. 
55 See Blumrosen 1971, Appendix I.   11
enable the agencies to point toward the appearance of some immediately measurable progress. 
In this respect, the emergence of contemporary affirmative action partly appears as a side-
effect of « administrative pragmatism »
56, a logic of action all the more powerful as the very 
survival of institutions such as the EEOC and the OFCC probably turns on the results that 
they might be able to claim credit for. That is, their legitimacy largely depended upon their 
demonstrable effectiveness in reaching their underlying goals, and these included black 
economic advancement – even by arguably illegal means. 
  The next step in the administrative and legal construction of affirmative action policies 
is a 1971 Supreme Court decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Company
57. There, the Supreme 
Court declared that the ban on employment discrimination enshrined in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, far from prohibiting only the most blatant forms of intentional 
discrimination, also applied to recruitment procedures that were «  fair in form but 
discriminatory in operation », such as hiring tests which, though « neutral on their face », 
would have the effect of «  freez[ing] the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices » because of their « adverse impact » on blacks and other disadvantaged minority 
groups
58. From then on, any statistically significant discrepancy in the racial distribution of 
the workforce traceable to one or several hiring procedures or criteria that could not be 
justified on grounds of « business necessity » were to be held illegal. As a result, the meaning 
of the word « discrimination » in the employment context underwent a dramatic expansion : 
the Supreme Court included within the purview of Title VII all forms of indirect 
discrimination, that is, recruitment practices that do not rely on any of the unlawful grounds 
for employment decisions enumerated in the Civil Rights Act (race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin) but still work to the disadvantage of a disproportionate number of minority 
group members – regardless of the employer’s actual motivations
59. As for identifying the 
extent of the disproportion that would qualify as evidence of « adverse impact » under Griggs, 
this was settled in the 1978 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, a 
document that was meant to draw up operational prescriptions that the EEOC and the OFCC 
could rely on in  
                                                 
56 See generally Skrentny (1996), at 110-144 – from which this development derives. 
57 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
58 Griggs v. Duke Power Company, at 431, 430. As a practical matter, only women, ethnoracial minorities and 
the handicapped may be protected against such indirect discrimination. This was established by the 1973 
Supreme Court decision San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez – in which Justice Lewis 
Powell’s majority opinion declared that « the poor » were not entitled to protection against discrimination as 
« disparate impact » because of the « amorphous » character of that group and because its members had not been 
« subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment » (San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), at 28)). 
59 A few years later, Britain adopted the Griggs-derived, extended conception of discrimination in its Sex 
Discrimination Act of 1975 and Race Relations Act of 1976. So did the Netherlands in 1983, and Sweden in 
1999, among others: see Guiraudon and Geddes (2003) ; Soininen and Graham (2000), at 195. The notion of 
« indirect discrimination » was also incorporated in EC legislation by a 1997 Council Directive regarding sex 
equality (Council Directive 97/80/EC of December 15 1997), and was subsequently extended to types of 
discrimination newly prohibited by the Treaty of Amsterdam: discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic 
origin (June 2000 Directive) and on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation 
(November 2000 Directive).   12
their enforcement activities. The key point was the following one:  
 
« For any hiring test used by a firm subject to (...) Title VII (...), if the success rate 
achieved by any racial, ethnic or gender group is less than four-fifths of the rate of the 




As a consequence, it would be held unlawful. Under this « four-fifths rule », if, for 
instance, 50% of the white applicants and less than 40% of the black applicants succeeded on 
a given test, then, that test would have to be withdrawn and replaced by another devoid of any 
«  adverse  » impact on racial minorities – unless carrying on with the first test could be 
justified on grounds of « business necessity ». 
Yet, at the beginning of the 1970s, because the average level of qualification among 
blacks was significantly lower than among whites as a result of school segregation, there were 
a host of cases where just any  color-blind recruitment procedure would have proved 
« discriminatory » under the Griggs principle. Therefore, an employer determined to reach a 
«  nondiscriminatory  » result had no other choice but to differentiate his requirements 
somehow according to the race of the applicant, a differentiation that could be made more or 
less explicitly. « Affirmative action » is simply the name given to that differentiation, when it 
is openly acknowledged as such.  
 
 
The U.S. Experience: Assessing Affirmative Action in Employment 
and University Admissions 
 
 
  Economists have used two approaches to measure the impact of antidiscrimination and 
affirmative action policies in the United States. The first one – time-series studies – attempts 
to link trends in earnings of program beneficiaries to the implementation of these policies, 
using macro-economic data in the absence of establishment-level ones. Such studies find that 
between 1940 and 1980 there has been a steady improvement in the economic status of 
blacks: while incomes of white men were growing at a rate of 2.2 percent during that period, 
incomes of black men registered a growth of 3.5 percent per year
61. Yet, this improvement is 
due mostly to positive changes in the provision of education for blacks at the school and high 
school level and to their migration from south to north and from menial agricultural jobs to 
better-paid, industrial ones
62. Affirmative action itself has only had a marginal effect on black 
wages : during that forty-year period, the wage gap narrowed as rapidly during the 20 years 
prior to 1960 – before affirmative action was even on the agenda – as it has during the 20-
year period after 1960 – when affirmative action was in place for part of the time
63. Even 
within the 1960-1980 period, the decrease in the black/white wage differential – from 38 
percent in 1964 to 28 percent in 1974 – clearly predates the implementation of affirmative 
action policies and is more closely related to the mere enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights 
                                                 
60 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 1607.4 (1998). 
61 Smith and Welch (1984), at 522. 
62 Donohue (1991), at 44-45. 
63 Smith and Welch (1984).   13
Act prohibiting discrimination in employment
64. Neither does affirmative action account for 
the increase in that differential recorded from 1975 to 1985
65, as a result of declining wages 
for low-skilled workers – among which African Americans are overrepresented
66 – and of the 
surge in the number of single-parent households within the black population
67. 
  The second method uses a cross-section approach comparing the relative labor market 
position of minorities and women in firms which are subject to affirmative action 
requirements under the federal contract compliance program and in firms which are not. The 
data are drawn from the reports that all firms with 100 or more employees and all federal 
contractors with 50 or more employees and contracts of $500,000 or more are required to file 
with the EEOC (EEO-1 reports). These reports contain information on the firm’s total 
employment in each of the nine occupational categories by race and sex. They also indicate 
whether or not the firm is a contractor. Among the firms required to file EEO-1 reports, only 
those federal contractors with at least fifty employees and with a single contract of $50,000 or 
more are under the obligation to have an affirmative action program. 
  These studies have on the whole found that the employment of minorities and women 
has increased a little more rapidly among federal contractors subject to affirmative action than 
in other, non-covered firms, at least during the 1970s. The author of the most extensive study, 
Jonathan Leonard, finds that black male employment relative to white male employment grew 
0.82 percent faster per year in contractor establishment than in non-contractor establishments, 
and faster still among contractors which had been subject to compliance reviews by the 
OFCC
68. This finding has been replicated in many other studies
69. Turning to the more recent 
period, Leonard reports that the effects of affirmative action on employment weakened in the 
early 1980s, as a result of lax enforcement of the policy and shrinking resources allocated to 
the OFCC in the early years of the Reagan administration. He summarizes the evidence as 
indicating that before 1980, the elasticity of black male employment growth to total 
employment growth was 1.7 among contractors, versus 1.2 percent among non-contractors. In 
contrast, after 1980, the corresponding numbers were 1 among contractors versus 1.1 among 
non-contractors
70. Perhaps because the main legal and public battles over affirmative action 
no longer center on the area of employment, no similar, large-scale study is available for the 
most recent period
71.  
                                                 
64 Donohue and Heckman (1991), at 1604, 1637-1640. See also Chay (1998) (finding that the relative pay – and 
employment level – of blacks appear to have been boosted at small establishments that were brought under the 
coverage of Title VII by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972). 
65 Jencks (1992), at 56-57. 
66 Wilson (1987). 
67 Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan (1995). 
68 Leonard (1984), at 380. 
69 Badgett (1999); Ashenfelter and Heckman (1976); Heckman and Payner (1989); Leonard (1994); Rogers and 
Spriggs (1996). The correlation seems to obtain in Canada as well, where the 1986 Federal Contractors 
Compliance Program – covering 845 contractors with a workforce of 1.1 million – requires organizations with 
100 or more employees bidding on federal government contracts of $200,000 or more to implement an 
«employment equity » policy (Jain and Lawler (2002)). Even beyond that specific requirement, in the private 
sector firms that were covered by the 1986 Employment Equity Act from the outset – mostly those operating in 
the fields of banking, transportation, and communications –, the overall representation of members of « visible 
minorities » (i.e. non-white persons, aborigines excepted) more than doubled between 1987 and 1999, from 4.9 
percent to almost 10 percent ; see Jain, Sloane and Horwitz (2003), at 21-23 and Longfield (2002). 
70 Leonard (1990). 
71 For a local study basically confirming the results of the former, see Button and Rienzo (2003). Cross-sectional 
impact studies do not take into account the likelihood that a successful affirmative action program among federal 
contractors may have a demonstration effect on non-contractors and induce them to also increase the 
employment of affirmative action beneficiaries, thus leading to an underestimation of the impact of the program. 
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the difference which these studies register between contractors   14
  As for university admissions, the data are similarly encouraging. Between 1972 and 
1996, the percentage of blacks enrolling in college the fall after completing high school rose 
from 44.6 percent to 56 percent, and the percentage of Hispanics enrolling rose from 45 
percent to 50.8 percent
72. Black enrolment as a percentage of all enrolments in universities 
other than « Historically Black » – i.e. Southern and formerly segregated – colleges rose from 
1.8 percent in 1960 to 4.2 percent in 1970, 8.2 percent in 1980, and 9 percent in 1994
73. 
Changes are also evident in professional schools, with the percentage of blacks growing from 
1 percent in 1960 to 7.5 percent in 1995 in law schools, and from 2.2 percent in 1964 to 8.1 in 
1995 in medical schools
74. Finally, while in 1971, among young adults age twenty-five to 
twenty-nine, only 11.5 percent of blacks and 10.5 percent of Latinos had college degrees – 
compared to 22 percent of whites –, by 1998, the black rate was up to 17.9 percent and the 
Latino number was 16.5 percent – with the white rate still significantly higher at 34.5 
percent
75. Yet, since the period of most rapidly rising enrolments – roughly the 1960s and the 
1970s – was one of sharp declines in poverty among minorities, following closely upon the 
desegregation of public schools, and was accompanied by antidiscrimination forces in the 
labor markets that likely affected the returns to higher education for them, simple time-series 
trends in minority enrolments may overstate the independent effects of affirmative action.  
  More specific evidence in this regard is now available, however. William Bowen and 
Derek Bok, the former presidents of Princeton and Harvard Universities, have recently 
published a study based on a statistically sophisticated analysis of the undergraduate 
admissions process and subsequent university and post-university experience of more than 
90,000 students who entered thirty-four selective
76 colleges and universities during the falls 
of 1951, 1976, and 1989, thus providing the first comprehensive examination of the actual 
effects of thirty years of affirmative action in American higher education
77.  
  Their findings are encouraging in many respects. First, notwithstanding the 
« mismatch » hypothesis according to which racial preferences in college admissions actually 
hurt their intended beneficiaries, by enticing minority youth to enter highly competitive 
colleges for which they are underprepared and in which they are more likely to fail
78, it turns 
out that black students at selective institutions are far more likely to graduate from college 
than either their black or white counterparts nationwide : 75 percent of black students entering 
selective colleges graduate within six years, as compared with a 40 percent graduation rate for 
all black colleges students and a 59 percent rate for white college students
79. As a matter of 
fact, black students – even those with the lowest SAT scores – graduated at higher rates the 
more selective the school they attended, even though the difference between their scores and 
                                                                                                                                                         
and non-contractor firms could well reflect a mere reshuffling of workers from one group of firms to another 
without improvement in the overall position of the group (Heckman and Wolpin (1976), at 545). 
72 Orfield and Whitla (2001), at 144. 
73 Holzer and Neumark (2000), at 509. 
74 Id. 
75 Orfield and Whitla (2001), at 144. 
76 As a matter of fact, race-based preferential treatment is confined to the most academically selective fifth of all 
four-year institutions. 
77 Bowen and Bok (1998). 
78 Sowell (1993); D’Souza (1995). 
79 Bowen and Bok (1998), at 55-59. The policy also hurts white applicants less than it seems : if race-neutral 
standards had been used and fewer blacks therefore admitted, the antecedent probability of being admitted of 
any particular white applicant who was in fact rejected would have risen only from about 25 percent to about 
26.5 percent, because there were so many rejected white candidates at approximately the same level of test 
scores and other qualifications that adding a few more places would not much have improved the chances of 
every one of them (Id, at 33-34). Race-based preferential treatment only slightly reduces the ex ante statistical 
group probability of elite school admission of whites.   15
grade point averages and those of their classmates was greater. The net effect of attending a 
more selective institution on completion rates for students with similar tests scores is positive, 
not negative – for black and white students alike
80. 
  Besides, the more selective a black graduate’s school, the higher his or her anticipated 
income – holding all else equal. Attending a selective school thus reduces the apparent 
discrimination African Americans face in the labor market considerably, especially for black 
women: within the sample population, the average black female graduate earned 2 percent 
less than her white classmate, whereas the national average showed a 14 percent differential. 
The disadvantage for black men was cut in half – 17 percent for the graduates of these 
selective schools, compared to 35 percent in the national population
81. As a general matter, 
the effect of college quality on the later wages of black men is roughly triple that for nonblack 
men
82. Thus, affirmative action in university admissions does seem to have a broader, positive 
impact on the economic condition of African Americans
83. 
  It also has other, desirable side effects of a different kind. Thus, to the question 
whether there has been a diffusion of benefits conferred upon the immediate recipients of 
preferential policies, the study brings a positive answer. While black and white college 
graduates are equally likely to participate in various kinds of civic and professional groups 
nationwide, among the graduates of these selective schools, blacks are strikingly more likely 
to do so, especially in social service, youth clubs, and elementary school organizations
84. 
Most important among those positive externalities of affirmative action is the expansion of 
medical service to underserved communities: black and Hispanic physicians are twice as 
likely to work in locations designated as health manpower shortage areas by the federal 
government as white physicians
85. Since those communities tend to be predominantly black
86, 
                                                 
80 Id, at 59-75, 114-115. Bowen and Bok offer two primary explanations for this finding. First, the more 
selective schools tend to have greater resources for scholarships and other forms of student aid – on which black 
students are more dependent than white students. Second, the more selective schools might be able to identify 
applicants who are more likely to graduate than might be predicted from the factors for which the study 
controlled (Id, at 63-64). Since the economic value of a college degree increases with the prestige of the school, 
moreover, all students have a greater financial incentive to remain in a more selective school. 
81 Bowen and Bok (1998), at 125. 
82 Kermit, Black and Smith (223). 
83 The evidence on how attending institutions of varying selectivity affects future earnings is mixed, however: 
compare Bowen and Bok (1998), at 128 (without controlling for pre-college aptitude, finds wage premium for 
attending selective institution), with Berg Dale and Krueger (1999) (controlling for pre-college aptitude, finds 
no wage premium for attending selective institution for either whites or blacks, though sample of blacks was 
small). Besides, these analyses do not distinguish effects of college quality on wages resulting from increased 
productivity from those resulting from the value of college quality as a signal in the labor market. Finally, it 
seems that African American earnings are much more sensitive than white earnings to differences in college 
grade point average and choice of major (Datcher Loury and Garman (1993)). Thus, among the 1976 cohort of 
the Bowen and Bok study, mean earnings of white men in 1995 who finished in the top-third of their class were 
$114,900. For African Americans they were actually higher at $115,800 (though this difference is not 
statistically significant). However, among those finishing in the bottom-third of their class, mean earnings for 
whites were $83,200, whereas mean earnings for blacks were $68,500 (Wydick (2002), at 17). This may suggest 
that in an environment of race-based preferential college admissions policies, the labor market discounts the 
signalling value of college degrees held by college graduates of targeted groups, with employers placing a 
greater weight on other signals such as class rank, choice of major, and grade point average. 
84 Bowen and Bok (1998), at 155-173. 
85 Id. 
86 This is not just an effect of class. Predominantly black communities are four times more likely to be 
underserved than communities with the same average income: see Komaromy, et. al. (1996), at 1306-1307, tbl. 1 
and 1307-1309.   16
race-based affirmative action in medical schools does promote a redistribution of medical 
resources that reduces inequality in that field
87. 
  Naturally, the Bowen and Bok study can be criticized on a number of grounds. For one 
thing, the study is confined to affirmative action in higher education, and its results may have 
little bearing on the effects of preferential policies for other purposes – in hiring or awarding 
opportunities to minority-owned businesses in particular. Also, it does not examine how these 
selective schools’ preferences may affect « the institutions and students that are lower down 
the academic food chain »
88. The success of race-based affirmative action at the elite schools 
might come at the cost of making integrated education more problematic at somewhat less 
selective institutions, whose potential pool of qualified black and Hispanic applicants has 
been drained as a result of the policy
89. Bowen and Bok also tend to ignore that the graduation 
rate of « affirmative action » students is probably lower than the one for all African American 
matriculants on which their assessment of the policy largely relies, since some of the black 
students had academic credentials strong enough to be admitted regardless of affirmative 
action and were thus presumably in a better position than the « special admits » to complete 
their undergraduate studies successfully
90. Finally, beyond these methodological 
imperfections, a more fundamental difficulty with using graduation rates to measure the 
success of preferential admission policies is that the former are not independent of the latter. 
Graduation standards do not exist independently of faculty decisions about the quality of 
work that should be regarded as minimally acceptable, and these decisions are strongly 
influenced by the quality of work actually produced by students – a variable on which race-
based affirmative action is bound to have an impact. In short, « the rates at which ‘specially 
admitted’ African-American students graduate (...) are not satisfactory measures of the 
academic success of minority preference policies because [they] are influenced by the 
existence of such policies  »
91.  Alternative data regarding whether «  affirmative action  » 
admits are «  qualified  » enough are thus needed. In this respect, the first comprehensive 
analysis of national passage rates on the bar examination undertaken in a study recently 
published by the Law School Admission Council – based on data from the class that entered 
law school in 1991 – draws a less comforting picture. It found that only 61% of blacks, as 
compared to 92% of whites, passed the exam on their first attempt. Besides, the failure of 
over a fifth of black law school graduates who sought entry into the profession ever to pass 
the bar is evidence that some law schools are not merely admitting, but graduating, a large 
number of students who lack the minimal competence necessary to enter the profession
92. 
  Consistent with other research, Bowen and Bok also found that within their sample, 
the average class rank (based on four-year cumulative grade point averages) of black 
matriculants was significantly lower than the average rank of white matriculants within every 
SAT interval. In other words, African Americans with the same SAT scores as white students 
underperform in college (considering grades as a measure of performance)
93. This raises the 
question of whether black students at selective institutions – who do as a group have lower 
                                                 
87 See generally Curtis (2002); Ready (2001); Xu et. al. (1997); Cantor, Miles, Laurence Baker and Dianne 
Baker (1996); Komaromy et. al. (1996); Moy and Bartman (1995). Keith, Bell and Williams (1987) report some 
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88 Schuck (2003), at 148. 
89 Klitgaard (1985), at 174-175; Sowell (1990), at 110. 
90 Sandalow (1999), at 1885. 
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92 Id, at 1895-1896. 
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test scores
94 – underperform relative to how they would have done in the absence of 
affirmative action, in which case some of them would have gone to less selective institutions. 
  According to a recent study by Stephen Cole and Elinor Barber
95, this might very well 
be the case. These authors find that African Americans who attend «  Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities  » (HCBU) do not underperform significantly, and that African 
Americans who attend elite schools are much more likely to underperform than African 
Americans who attend nonelite schools. Controlling for SAT scores, there is an inverse 
correlation between grades and school selectivity for African Americans and – to a smaller 
extent – for Latinos, while there is apparently none for Asians and whites
96. This suggests that 
the underperformance phenomenon – possibly due to the competitive disadvantage these 
students initially face – might be a function of the race-based preferential treatment 
specifically granted to black and Hispanic applicants, in line with the «  mismatch  » 
hypothesis erroneously discarded by Bowen and Bok on the basis of graduation rates only. 
  The grade differential between black/Hispanic and Asian/white students may also 
have far-reaching effects on the career choices of the former, in particular as far as selection 
of academia is concerned. Grades do influence academic self-confidence, which in turn has a 
strong impact on the likelihood that such a choice be made. As a matter of fact, Cole and 
Barber show that for African Americans, «  attending an elite school rather than a less 
selective school is a deterrent to selecting academia as a final-choice career »
97. According to 
their estimates, black students are twice as likely to persist with academic aspirations if they 
go to either a state university or an HBCU than if they go to an elite school
98. Paradoxical as 
it may seem, race-based affirmative action in college admissions may thus help account for 
the still-dramatically low proportions of black and Latino faculty members at American 
institutions of higher education
99. 
  Yet, absent affirmative action, the percentage of Black and Latino students at the most 
selective colleges and universities would be even lower. Thus, in the institutions included in 
Bowen and Bok’s sample, the adoption of a strict race-neutral standard would have reduced 
the number of blacks by between 50 percent and 75 percent
100. Similarly, another study by 
Linda Wightman, the former director of research for the Law School Admissions Council, 
showed that if a « color-blind » and strictly credential-based admissions process – one taking 
into account only undergraduate grade point average and LSAT scores – had been applied to 
the group of persons applying to the 173 law schools approved by the American Bar 
Association in 1990-1991, then 90 percent of those self-identified as « black » would not have 
been admitted to any law school in the United States
101. Blacks would have made up only 
1.6% of the total number of accepted students – instead of 6.8%
102.  
Wightman’s findings are consistent with the actual experience at state law schools in 
California and Texas that have been barred from using racial or ethnic information in making 
admission decisions
103. Thus, at Boalt Hall, the law school at the University of California-
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Berkeley – which had enrolled an average of 24 black students each year between 1968 and 
1996 –, in 1997, the first year after passage of Proposition 209, none of the African-
Americans or Native Americans who applied was admitted, and only seven of the Latino 
applicants were
104. Even more significant drops in African-American enrolment can be seen 
at the law schools at the University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA) and the University of 
Texas: from 10.3% in 1996 to 1.4 % in 2000 at UCLA and from 7% in 1996 to 1.7% in 1999 
at Texas
105. Considering the two most selective law schools in California during the period 
from 1998 to 2002, African-Americans comprised only 2.9% of the students at UCLA Law 
School, and 3.4% of the students at Boalt Hall
106.  
  In order to counter this arguably disturbing trend, various measures have been 
considered. One of the most widely discussed would shift the focus from preferences based 
on race or ethnicity to race-neutral preferences based on economic disadvantage
107. This 
would channel affirmative action benefits to those in the currently favored groups who most 
need help, while extending them to low-income whites. Because black and Hispanic youth are 
more likely to be from low-income backgrounds than whites and other non-Hispanics, the 
argument goes, income-based preferences in college admissions would benefit them 
disproportionately. However, unless elite colleges dramatically reduce their reliance on high 
school grades and standardized test scores, class-based preferences cannot do much to 
mitigate the impact of the elimination of race-based preferences. This is so because blacks 
and Hispanics constitute only a small fraction of all high-scoring disadvantaged youth. 
Although blacks or Hispanics with test scores in the top ten percent are three times as likely 
to have incomes less than $20,000 than whites and other non-Hispanics, only 17.2 percent of 
high-scoring black or Hispanic youth come from such low-income families
108. Because test 
scores are so strongly related to family incomes, a small share of the high-scoring minority 
youth – those most likely to benefit from a race-based criterion at selective schools – are 
actually low-income. Thus, for one black or Hispanic student who both comes from a low-
income family and has scores that are above the threshold for gaining admission to the 
academically selective universities, there are almost six times as many white students
109. 
Consequently, a college now administering a race-based affirmative action plan would have 
to grant preferences to six times as many low-income students to « yield » the same number 
of black and Hispanic freshmen – an option widely perceived as unrealistic. This leads to the 
conclusion that « class-based preferences cannot be substituted for race-based policies if the 
objective is to enrol a class that is both academically excellent and diverse »
110. 
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  Another strategy is that of «  percentage plans  ». Thus, on 15 April 1997, the 
legislature of Texas responded to the drop in the number of black and Hispanic students due 
to the elimination of affirmative action programs in state universities by voting a bill 
instructing those universities to admit the top 10% of every high school’s graduates regardless 
of grades and test scores
111. Similar policies have been introduced in other states where 
affirmative action is no longer part of the public higher education system, such as California – 
where the percentage of automatically admitted graduates has been set at 4% – and Florida 
(20%)
112. As expected, this new arrangement has helped reduce the ongoing decline in the 
proportion of blacks and Hispanics among state university students, since in these states there 
are still a large number of high schools where virtually all pupils – including the top x% – 
belong to either one of these two minority groups. Because high school grades, like test 
scores, correlate somewhat with race – with whites and Asians having higher grades than 
blacks and Latinos –, a percent plan in a state where all high schools were racially integrated 
would not yield much racial diversity at the university level. It is the persistence of de facto 
school segregation that provides state authorities with a functional substitute for race-based 
affirmative action
113.  
  But this is just one of the many difficulties that percentage plans raise. Another one is 
that in California and Florida, while the plans may ensure diversity within the state university 
system as a whole, they do not achieve diversity at the most prestigious colleges: black and 
Hispanic enrolment is simply shifted from more to less selective institutions
114. As far as the 
minority parents are concerned, the plans may also set up perverse incentives: should they 
attempt to send their child to an integrated high school that provides a better education, or 
rather to a low-performing, segregated high school where she will have a greater chance of 
performing in the top x%, and thus gaining college admission? Moreover, since the new 
procedure does not draw any qualitative distinction between high schools, it often introduces 
a less stringent qualification standard for admission than the one involved in the former, 
openly acknowledged affirmative action programs, and thus may well end up yielding a less 
well-prepared population of black and Hispanic matriculants. Last but not least, the plans’ 
purported  « color-blindness »  is  clearly  disingenuous, since they were adopted with the 
specific intent of increasing the representation of African Americans and Hispanics in the 
public higher education system. What we have here is simply a « substitution strategy » in 
which what looks like the secondary effect of a formally neutral principle of allocation is in 
fact the reason why that principle has been adopted in the first place, given the perceived 
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illegitimacy of pursuing the decision maker’s true objective in a more straightforward 
manner
115. The underlying assumption seems to be that Americans object to race-based 
selection rules, but do not object to the pursuit of explicitly race-egalitarian outcomes through 
public policies that are formally color-blind. Paradoxically enough, « the explicit use of race 
in a college admissions formula is forbidden, while the intentional use of a proxy for race 
publicly adopted so as to reach a similar result is allowed »
116. 
  In this respect, a case can be made that the United States is slowly – and most 
irregularly – moving toward a French-like model of formally « color-blind » but arguably 
« race-oriented »
117 public policies, whose most distinctive feature lies in a principled 
negation of race as a legal category leading to a similar search for proxies of different 
kinds
118. 
  In France, as opposed to the United States, the Constitution is indisputably color-
blind: Article 1 of the 1958 Constitution provides that « the Republic (…) guarantees the 
equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law, regardless of origin, race or religion  »
119. 
Because this provision prohibits not only discriminations but all racial distinctions 
whatsoever
120, there is no census question on race or ethnicity, and under current legislation, 
public bodies are generally forbidden from storing data « revealing, in any direct or indirect 
way, a person’s racial origins »
121. As a consequence, disproportional distribution of goods – 
housing, jobs, placement in higher education – by race and ethnicity is virtually impossible to 
observe. Members of ethnic minorities are typically described as «  immigrants  » or as 
« second-generation immigrants » – even those who are French citizens –, and most surveys 
of social mobility and acculturation focus on foreign residents – identified by country of 
origin
122. In addition to the integrative Republican tradition of the French Revolution, 
memories of mass arrests and deportation of Jews during the Vichy Era have deeply 
delegitimized any policy that categorize individuals on the basis of ethnic origin
123. The 
aversion to recognizing race is such that in the initial draft of the foundational law of July 
1972 banning discrimination and incitement to racial violence and punishing perpetrators in 
criminal courts with stiff fines and jail sentences, the word « race » itself was omitted. Only at 
the last moment did the law committee accept to weave race into the bill as an explicitly 
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illegal ground for discrimination. But for this belated decision, there would have been no 
mention of the word « race » in the French law against racism
124. 
  Therefore, as far as affirmative action is concerned (the French phrase is 
« discrimination positive »), the main operational criterion for identifying its beneficiaries is 
obviously not race – nor gender
125  ; it is geographical location: residents of socio-
economically disadvantaged areas – where minority members tend to be concentrated – will 
indirectly benefit from the additional input of financial resources allocated by state agencies 
to that area as a whole
126. Thus, problems that North American or British decision-makers 
would tend to conceptualize as « ethnic dilemmas »
127 are officially seen through a different, 
territorial lens. 
  However, since some of the criteria used for delineating these « priority educational 
zones »  (Zones d’éducation prioritaire – ZEPs) or tax-free zones («  zones franches »)  – 
namely, the rate of failure in high school, the unemployment rate, or the percentage of 
residents age under 25 – are themselves correlated with the proportion of children whose 
parents are foreign nationals
128 (assuming that the percentage of foreigners itself is not taken 
into account in the provision of public funds, which may also be the case), French affirmative 
action policies, although officially embodying a space-based and class-based approach of 
affirmative action, may also be understood as indirectly and implicitly targeting groups that, 
in the American context, would be considered  as  « ethnic »  or  « racial »  minorities,  in 
particular the group of second-generation North African immigrants. It may then seem 
plausible to read this formally color-blind policy as partaking of a «  hidden agenda  » 
specifically directed at accelerating the integration of these immigrants – through an 
ingenious « substitution strategy » similar to the newly adopted American one. In this light, 
the preferential distribution of state funding to ZEPS – as well as the urban development 
policies (« la politique de la ville ») also typical of affirmative action à la française
129– would 
simply work as an (admittedly imperfect) functional equivalent of the openly color-conscious 
affirmative action programs, insofar as they do have an expected, positive «  disparate 
impact » on individuals of North African extraction. Whether such indirect strategies – deeply 
embedded in many sectors of French public policy and recently experimented in the United 
States – actually succeed in avoiding the polarization and stigmatization effects triggered by 
race-based affirmative action remains to be seen. 
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Justifications for affirmative action 
 
 
The two predominant justifications for affirmative action policies developed in North 
America are the corrective justice argument – the notion that affirmative action offers a 
measure of compensation to the victims of past injustice – and the multiculturalist argument – 
the idea that these programs help promote an intrinsically or derivatively beneficial type of 
diversity, of a broadly « cultural » nature. Yet, upon further examination, neither of these 
arguments seems entirely satisfactory – to say the least. 
  Initially, affirmative action was often justified as a means of compensating members 
of groups that had been victimized in the past by some pervasive state-sanctioned and/or 
societal discrimination, the effects of which were still conspicuous. Under this backward-
looking rationale, the imperative of compensatory justice would require society to do what it 
can to restore the victims’ descendants to the position that they would have occupied had the 
wrongs not been committed. However, as a justification for the existing programs, the 
compensation argument fails on a number of grounds. First, the individuals who bear the cost 
of affirmative action are usually not guilty of any wrongdoing
130. Second – and symmetrically 
–, the beneficiaries of affirmative action may not have suffered discrimination at the hands of 
the specific institution (public or private) responsible for setting up the program, and so may 
not be entitled to «  compensation  » strictly defined, in the absence of any judicially 
identifiable damage. The restitution rationale could arguably justify affirmative action for the 
descendants of slaves and Native Americans. It cannot justify extending preferential treatment 
to immigrants, linguistic minorities like Hispanics, or geographic origin groups like Asians 
and Pacific Islanders. Yet, in North America, millions of immigrants become automatically 
eligible for affirmative action the moment they set foot on U.S. or Canadian soil, competing 
for preferences with blacks and American Indians. Third, affirmative action policies generally 
award opportunities to the best qualified and most advantaged among the preferred class, thus 
distributing goods to those presumed to be least injured by discrimination. Such policies 
therefore fail to match the amount of compensation to the degree of individual injury and 
exclude the people possibly most entitled to it, who are the ones least likely to benefit from 
public procurement programs or to compete – or have their children compete – for admission 
to selective schools. Besides, employers and admissions officers have never determined the 
weight that they give to race in relation to the degree of damage that the individual applicant 
may or may not have suffered in the past. Therefore – and unless one is willing to settle for an 
unattractive model of group entitlement under which racial entities constitute the relevant 
units of moral agency, with whites identified as a debtor class –, the failure of affirmative 
action to meet the exacting standards of individualized remedies should lead to abandoning 
the compensation argument, for the mismatch between the compensatory  theory and the 
integrative practice of affirmative action threatens the latter’s moral legitimacy
131. 
  At first sight, the multiculturalist argument may seem more to the point. In the United 
States, it appeared first in a 1978 Supreme Court decision, Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke
132, in which the Court, through the opinion of Justice Lewis Powell, 
struck down a racial quota that had been set up by the Medical School of the University of 
California at Davis. Yet, Powell insisted that race and ethnicity might still be taken into 
account in university admissions, provided that it be in a flexible and individual-centered 
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way, as part of a legitimate concern for promoting the diversity of « experiences, outlooks and 
ideas » among members of the student body
133. By casting racial diversity as just one more 
component of the kind of global diversity traditionally favored by university officials for 
educational purposes, he thus recharacterized affirmative action as a means of achieving an 
end internal to the academic sphere – rather than as a technique for promoting a redistributive 
goal external to it. His claim relied on two analytically distinct propositions: first, that 
diversity of experience and values was an educational good; second, that diversity of 
experience and values was strongly linked to diversity of race and ethnicity
134. The (obviously 
reasonable) underlying assumption was that students were not merely consumers of 
educational services, but were themselves inputs into the educational process
135. 
  As a justification for large-scale, race-based preferential treatment, however, the 
diversity argument is at best incomplete. First, while it is plausible that the racial diversity of 
a classroom would enhance discussion of social, political, and cultural subjects by enriching 
the variety of perspectives voiced, it is hard to see the cognitive relevance of racial diversity 
to investigations in the hard sciences, for instance. Yet, schools extend racial preferences in 
admission to graduate programs in the latter field, even though these disciplines aim at the 
understanding of structures and processes whose existence – in contrast to human institutions 
– is presumed not to depend upon acts of human judgment or valuation. In that case, diversity 
of experience and values is simply irrelevant. Second, this alleged correlation between racial 
diversity and diversity of viewpoints may well further entrench some existing stereotypes as 
to the typical features of the different racial groups
136. Third, if the genuine educational 
interest is to ensure that a diversity of opinions be heard in the classroom, it is not entirely 
clear why schools should not select students directly for the ideological diversity they can be 
expected to bring, rather than use race as a crude proxy for this presumably desirable feature. 
If what really matters is some race-neutral quality of the beneficiaries, why doesn’t the 
program target that quality without using the race proxy? And how strong must the proxy be, 
or rather, to what degree does race/ethnicity have to correlate to the characteristic in order for 
an institution to be allowed to look for the race proxy rather than to look for the underlying 
characteristic itself ?
137 These questions remain unanswered. Finally, there are many axes of 
differentiation related to the opinions voiced by every individual student – race, religion, 
party identification, place of residence, to name but a few. The notion of diversity alone does 
not provide any clue as to which of them should get more attention from university officials. 
Thus, their focus on race, while downplaying or practically leaving aside other conceivable 
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criteria for social classification, does stand as an arbitrary restriction, at least within the 
diversity paradigm. In order to justify such a discriminatory selection, one would need to fall 
back on an openly political judgment as to which cleavages matter most, a judgment that the 
diversity argument was precisely meant to avoid. 
  The argument does contain a kernel of truth, however, which is well-captured by legal 
scholar Anthony Kronman’s most sophisticated defense of it:  
 
« Segregation implies differences of early experience which in turn entails differences 
of adult perception, belief and judgment (...) So long as segregation remains the fact it 
is in America today, the correlation between being white, on the one hand, and black 
or Hispanic on the other, and holding a certain set of beliefs about issues of moral and 
political importance – about the honesty of the police, the fairness of the courts, the 
openness of the economy to all with energy and talent – is bound to be a strong one. 
And so long as this correlation exists to a meaningful degree, it is reasonable to think 
that a program of racial and ethnic diversification is a means to, or a component of, the 
general goal of value diversification – the basic educational goal of assembling a 




  In this light – and contrary to Justice Powell’s notion that race ought to count as just 
one dimension of diversity among many others, not to enjoy any privileged status
139 –, the 
current practice of giving it more weight than other diversity-enhancing features in the 
admissions process might be supported by the sociological claim that race does remain the 
most salient dividing line in American society – as reflected in the still-pervasive patterns of 
residential and educational segregation
140. However, these patterns are both contingent and 
undesirable. As Kronman aptly puts it, the relative strength of the diversity argument thus 
« depends, in part at least, on the affirmation of the force of certain facts we hope and mean to 
change »
141. Ultimately, affirmative action is just a means to that end. 
  In other words, contrary to what the diversity argument suggests, race is not actually 
considered as a mere proxy for race-neutral variables in affirmative action programs. It is 
directly, causally relevant to the policy’s most convincing goal – namely, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court once put it, « the integration of [subordinated groups] into the mainstream of American 
society »
142. Properly conceived, affirmative action is an instrument of social 
dehierarchization. In the American context, the underlying strategy is that the immediate 
objective of preferential treatment – the increase in the number of African Americans working 
in occupations carrying power and prestige – should ultimately bring about a decrease in the 
degree of racial identification by reducing the existing correlation between color and social 
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standing
143. Improving blacks’ economic and occupational predicament will hopefully 
diminish the reliability of race as a proxy for status in the existing hierarchy. For it is the 
relative concentration of blacks in its lower tiers that is now largely responsible for the 
perpetuation of invidious stereotypes as to their alleged inability to move beyond menial 
occupations, stereotypes that are bound to linger as long as their apparent evidential basis 
remains. That basis is the noticeable underrepresentation of blacks in mainstream institutions, 
especially in higher positions. By correcting for that underrepresentation and thus reducing 
the correlation between race and occupational status, affirmative action might help lessen the 
instrumental value of such stereotypes. Insofar as the enduring saliency of race as a criterion 
of social categorization largely stems from its information-laden nature – which is itself a 
function of the empirically observable inequality in the distribution of social goods between 
blacks and whites –, the policy’s positive effects on blacks’ position in the hierarchy of 
income and occupation may eventually work toward a deracialization of American society
144. 
Paying attention to the remaining inequalities in the distribution of goods between 
racial groups, however, does not necessarily lead to considering those groups as subjects in 
matters of distributive justice. The only justification for reducing those inequalities lies in the 
expected effect of that reduction in equalizing the distribution between – for example – black 
and white individuals of one social good of a specific kind – namely, the absence of damage 
experienced as a result from one’s race being empirically correlated with a given position at 
the bottom of the economic and occupational hierarchy. From a moral point of view, the sole 
area of concern is the extent of the disadvantage suffered by those individuals identified as 
belonging to a stigmatized group, the only purpose of race-based affirmative action being to 
suppress the portion of that disadvantage for which racial identification is specifically 
responsible
145. Insofar as the policy would succeed in eradicating the negative stereotypes 
attached to that group membership, it should prove all the more beneficial for all members of 
the group considered as individuals as their social experience is actually determined by the 
fact of being thus identified: in that way, the economic progress of African Americans partly 
due to affirmative action may well be described as a collective good
146. Yet, the status of the 
group, its position in the social hierarchy, matter only insofar as they shape the set of options 
                                                 
143 Dworkin (1985), at 294-295. 
144 On this view, proportions are indeed important. When members of underrepresented racial groups are present 
only in token numbers, this heightens the salience of their racial identities and primes racial stereotypes (Taylor 
(1998)). A « critical mass » of individuals of a given racial group needs to be present for outsiders to notice the 
internal heterogeneity in that group.  
145 Thus, affirmative action programs « do not distinguish among individuals « because of » their ancestry or 
skin color. They distinguish among individuals based on whether they are subject to systematic social 
disadvantage because of the ways others classify them » (Anderson (2002), at 1235). The basis of the racial 
classification relevant for affirmative action is that disadvantage, not « race » itself. Or rather, race ought to be « 
conceived as a mode of social inequality based on myths of biological or other intrinsic difference » (Id.): there 
is nothing inconsistent in referring to the presence of a conception of race as an intrinsic characteristic in the 
minds of people who act on it without endorsing the truth of that conception. That implicitly derivative meaning 
of race is the relevant one as far as affirmative action is concerned. In that context, the word does not point to a a 
commonly agreed-upon anthropological classification of human beings into a plurality of genetically distinct 
subgroups, but rather, in an elliptic fashion, to those collectivities who have experienced the most severe forms 
of discrimination originally predicated upon this now quasi-defunct « scientific » racism (Hollinger (1995), at 
34-35). While « race » used to relate to a set of biologically determined, immutable, group-owned features, it 
now serves to designate a specific kind of social identities – essentially produced by some discriminatory 
behaviors that one can – and should – attempt to modify through political and legal action. According to what 
currently stands as its most legitimate definition, race thus tends to be reduced to a basis of illegitimate 
inequalities – hopefully bound to disappear over time. 
146 See Olson (1965), at 14-16, 36-43, 98-102.    26
available to its members. The moral importance of the group’s welfare is purely derivative; it 
only depends on the impact of group membership on the individuals involved. 
  Yet, attempts to reach that – ultimately individual-oriented – goal of racial integration 
may also be frustrated by some negative side effects specifically induced by the visibility of 
affirmative action programs. For the very fact of acknowledging the existence of a system of 
allocation taking account of race may well jeopardize the deracialization that one is trying to 
bring about in the long run. It is at least conceivable that by openly integrating race into the 
decision process of firms and universities – and therefore confirming its meaningfulness 
without being able to impose a common understanding of the meaning involved –, affirmative 
action might risk rigidify and relegitimize the racial cleavages that it was meant to eradicate – 
as several US social psychology studies seem to suggest
147. 
  Among the negative side effects one may consider, the most dangerous one is 
probably the additional stigma possibly inflicted on the intended beneficiaries of affirmative 
action programs. For insofar as these policies logically imply an acknowledgment of the fact 
that those who benefited from the « preference » involved would not have gained their current 
positions without it, there is a substantial risk of fostering the suspicion that they are not fully 
qualified for such positions. Since it is generally impossible to draw a line among the 
potential beneficiaries of affirmative action between those who did take advantage of it and 
those whose qualifications were already high enough to make any kind of preferential 
treatment appear entirely unnecessary, there is a chance that (to take the most obvious 
example) all African Americans should be further stigmatized as a result of the policy’s race-
specific nature
148.  
True enough, the difficulty here is to assess the extent of that additional effect of 
stigmatization specifically related to the visibility of affirmative action as compared with the 
stigma already attached to blackness as such – a stigma the programs may still help reduce in 
the long run, once all their consequences are taken into account. As a general matter, the 
relevant question is « whether affirmative action fosters more racial hostility and stereotyping 
than would exist without it »
149. Most of the relevant studies conducted in the field of social 
psychology, however, do suggest that this additional effect of stigmatization specifically 
triggered by the official nature of affirmative action – whether or not it is ultimately 
compensated for by the programs’ other positive effects – is not merely hypothetical
150. The 
fact of officially defining among all competing applicants one or several categories of 
« potential beneficiaries of affirmative action » may actually have a negative impact on their 
relationships with those who remain outside of this newly created ensemble. In particular, 
                                                 
147 See Brewer and Miller (1988), at 320, 324; Rothbart and John (1985), at 95-96; Krull and Wyer (1980).  
148 Public opinion data on affirmative action suggest that blacks themselves are keenly aware of their 
vulnerability in this respect. For while support of that policy is fairly weak as a general matter, it is positively 
correlated with the number of groups included among its beneficiaries. For instance, the degree of hostility faced 
by affirmative action is significantly lower when the programs are presented as benefiting both blacks and 
women than when they are presented as benefiting African Americans alone (Steeh and Krysan (1996), at 137-
138). Naturally, one may be tempted to believe that only racism and hostility towards blacks specifically can 
account for the stronger disapprobation of a policy when that policy is designed to assist no other group but 
them. Yet, black respondents also seem to prefer affirmative action programs that target other groups as well 
over those that target them exclusively, despite the relative loss of material resources that such a shift would 
entail as far as they are concerned (Kinder and Sanders (1996), at 183-184). A possible explanation for that 
somewhat counterintuitive result is that blacks take into account the potential stigmatization effect that 
affirmative action may have on them and believe, rightly or wrongly, that it will be mitigated if they are not the 
only group targeted for such special treatment. 
149 Rubenfeld (1997), at 446-447. 
150 See Hamilton Krieger (1995) and Hamilton Krieger (1998) (reviewing a substantial number of studies), as 
well as Howard and Rothbart (1980), Heilman, Block and Lucas (1992), Nascoste (1990), Nascoste (1987).   27
several experiments have shown that once the category « black » has been activated anew by 
the announcement of an affirmative action program at a given firm or university to benefit 
« blacks »  among  others,  individuals become more inclined to use that category as an 
«  anchoring ground for their interpretations  »
151 of related (or unrelated) events. In other 
words, the activation threshold of the category declines
152. Therefore, it would be unwise to 
dismiss the possibility that the distinctions among applicants reinstitutionalized by affirmative 
action should come to be understood as an implicit confirmation of the validity of existing 
racial and gender (negative) stereotypes, creating the impression that such stereotypes are 
actually endorsed by the authorities responsible for establishing the programs
153. In order for 
the elevation of minority group members in the economic and occupational hierarchy to be 
taken as evidence of how inaccurate those stereotypes are, one should not be able to dismiss 
their success as resulting from an antimeritocratic scheme specifically designed to that end. 
Similarly, a minority member can only function as a « role model » if he or she is perceived 
as having been appointed because of qualifications rather than race or sex. The very visibility 
of affirmative action programs – of their preferential, non-strictly meritocratic component – 
may prove detrimental in this respect
154. Therefore, while affirmative action can be justified 
in theory as a key element in a long-term strategy for dismantling well-entrenched structures 
of subordination
155, as a practical matter, it might prove counter-productive to fully disclose 
its most distinctive and most contentious features. Unpleasant as it may be, affirmative action 






                                                 
151 Dobry (1986), at 198.  
152 Rothbart and John (1985), at 96. 
153 See Garcia, et. al. (1981); Summers (1991). This is definitely not a trivial matter. After conducting a series of 
well-designed experimental studies, psychologists Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson have persuasively argued 
that academically talented black students tend to underperform on tests that they believe will be used to measure 
their intellectual ability partly because of the anxiety induced by their fear of confirming the still-pervasive 
stereotype as to their inferiority in that field (Steele and Aronso (1995)). That the existence of affirmative action 
programs may still intensify the sense that African American students are expected to underperform 
academically is therefore a serious concern. Besides, other public opinion studies suggest that the mere mention 
of affirmative action does reinforce negative stereotypes about blacks: see Sniderman and Piazza (1993), 97-
104; Sniderman and Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race, at 37-40. 
154 The increasingly widespread tendency to launch a broader attack on the predominant conception of « merit » 
as defined mostly by test scores (see, for instance, Guinier and Sturm (1996); Guinier and Torres (2002)) may be 
understood in part as a short-term, radical strategy designed to defuse any stigma potentially induced by the 
conspicuousness of affirmative action by directly challenging the validity of the norm from which these policies 
stand as a departure. 
155 Fiss (1976); Sabbagh (2003a), at 251-301; Sunstein (1994). 
156 The temptation to conceal what affirmative action requires as a practical matter is clearly present in the 
United States (Sabbagh (2003b)) and elsewhere. Thus, Australian affirmative action legislation draws a 
distinction between public and confidential reports: while public reports provide statistical information on the 
workforce and an outline of the measures undertaken to reduce existing imbalances, a detailed analysis of these 
measures is found in confidential reports only. In Canada, too, information on the race and gender distribution of 
the workforce is available for public inspection, but the affirmative plans themselves are not (Faundez (1994), at 
44).   28
Identifying the beneficiaries: the Indian dilemma 
 
 
  Affirmative action is often criticized through « slippery-slope arguments »
157 that take 
for granted the theoretical and/or practical impossibility of restricting the reach of the 
programs to the groups that need them most and pinpoint the absurdity of their alleged 
underlying principle, according to which proportional representation in all positions of power 
and prestige should obtain for each and every possible « group »
158. But this is a much too 
simplistic – if not altogether fanciful – account of what affirmative action is about. The 
problem of open-endedness that these arguments emphasize can be dealt with simply by 
acknowledging that affirmative action inevitably relies on a set of historical, sociological and 
political judgments as to the identity of the relevant reference groups – those whose members 
ought not to be overrepresented at the bottom of the economic and occupational hierarchy. 
For all « groups » are not of a similar kind
159. Some are only statistical aggregates 
__ in which 
case the distinctive feature of their « members » is defined on a quasi-random basis, and will 
be considered arbitrary by insiders and outsiders alike (think of the group of people with 
blond hair and brown eyes). Others are associations set up to promote some shared interests 
or ideas through individual affiliation with an organizational structure specifically designed to 
that end (political parties, unions, etc.). Only a limited proportion of all collective entities are 
ascriptive, status groups 
__ whose existence, far from being the product of a foundation of any 
kind, remains largely independent from the will of their individual members, and whose 
impact on their social experience and subjective identity is the strongest. African Americans 
or Indian untouchables are the paradigmatic example: 
 
« [They] are viewed as a group; they view themselves as a group; their identity is in 
large part determined by membership in the group; their social status is linked to the 




Naturally, one may well disagree over exactly which groups would qualify for a 
description of this kind. Yet, the margin of disagreement is not infinite. To take but one 
example, in the United States, while poverty surely curtails an individual’s life prospects to a 
                                                 
157 The distinctive feature of « slippery-slope arguments » is their claim that the decision at issue will naturally 
lead to other decisions whose unwanted character remains undisputed among defenders and opponents of the 
first one alike. One may underline either the evil nature of the predicament lying at the bottom of the slope, or 
the element of arbitrariness supposedly involved in breaking out from such a perverse cycle before reaching that 
dreaded predicament (assuming that option is still available) ; see generally Bernard Williams (1995), at 213-
222. 
158 See, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court decision Hughes v. Superior Court (339 U.S. 460 (1949), at 464) – 
likening the pressure brought upon a Californian employer to increase the proportion of African Americans in 
his workforce to the structurally unlimited list of further demands that may then be voiced on account of 
« Hungarians in Cleveland, Polish in Buffalo, Germans in Milwaukee, Portuguese in New Bedford and 
Mexicans in San Antonio... ». 
159 See generally Young (1990), at 43-46 
__ from which the following development derives. 
160 Fiss (1976), at 148. See also the U.S. Supreme Court decision Beauharnais v. Illinois (343 U.S. 250, 263 
(1952)) – arguing that « … a man’s job and his educational opportunities and the dignity accorded him may 
depend as much on the reputation of the racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his 
own merits (…). [There are] groups with whose position and esteem in society the affiliated individual may be 
inextricably involved ».    29
considerable extent, the matrix of such disadvantage lies in the very fact of being poor 
__ not 
in the fact of being perceived as belonging to the group of « poor people ». In contrast,  
 
« Black men and women (...) are not free to choose for themselves in what roles – or 
as members of which social groups – others will characterize them. They are black, 
and no other feature of personality or allegiance or ambition will so thoroughly 
influence how they will be perceived and treated by others, and the range and 
character of the lives that will be open to them »
161.  
 
  In this light, there is an answer to the slippery-slope argument, in theory at least : the 
only groups eligible for affirmative action policies are those, membership of which stands as a 
crucial feature of the individual’s identity 
__ insofar as it shapes the expectations and 
behaviors of outsiders toward her
162.  
  As a practical matter, however, this restriction does not provide any rule of thumb for 
solving the identification-of-the-beneficiaries problem – a problem that was not really 
perceived as such in the United States until quite recently. While it is true that the pivotal 
political and administrative decisions were taken when the population of Hispanics and Asian 
Americans was small – and before officials and civil rights leaders understood that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 would produce so many new immigrants from Asia 
and Latin America
163 –, the question of whether ethnoracial minorities eligible for affirmative 
action (blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans) might have differential needs for it 
was then largely avoided by American policymakers and judges alike.  
In India, the picture is dramatically different. Affirmative action began under British 
colonial rule as a set of programs designed for the advancement of the lowest caste – the so-
called « Untouchables » –, first in the field of education – special schools were established on 
their behalf as early as 1892 –, then in the civil service, where in 1946 12.6 percent of the 
vacancies were reserved for them to reflect their proportion in the population. At the same 
time, the British also introduced quotas in political representation: starting in 1919, a given 
percentage of seats were reserved for the Untouchables on the provincial legislative councils 
as well as in the central legislative assembly. In the Poona Pact of 1932, after some heated 
debate between Gandhi’s Indian National Congress Party and Dr Ambedkar – the first 
Untouchable leader to have a pan-Indian influence –, the British government maintained and 
extended this policy of reserving electoral seats for Untouchable candidates within a general 
electorate, while rejecting Ambedkar’s demand for a system of separate electorates that would 
have allowed the Untouchables to select their own representatives, as had been the case for 
Muslims since 1909
164. The difference was significant, because all voters were still qualified 
to vote for one candidate or another in any given district – and untouchable voters were never 
a majority. After independence, the 1950 Indian Constitution retained the principle of 
reserved seats for the Untouchables – renamed « Scheduled Castes » (SCs), in 1935 –, raising 
the percentage to 15 percent, their proportion of the Indian population according to the 1951 
                                                 
161 Dworkin (1985), at 294. 
162 See Balkin (1997), at 2360 (emphasizing that the « groups » affirmative action should be concerned with are 
those for whom « status identity (...) affect[s] a large percentage of one’s personal interactions with others, and 
(...) has many mutually supporting and overlapping effects ») ; Melissa Williams (2000), at 65 (suggesting that 
« marginalized ascriptive groups » have four characteristic features : « (1) patterns of social and political 
inequality are structured along the lines of group membership ; (2) generally, membership in them is not 
experienced as voluntary ; (3) generally, membership in them is not experienced as mutable ; and (4) generally, 
there are negative meanings assigned to group identity by the broader society or the dominant culture »). 
163 Graham (2002). 
164 Jaffrelot (2002).    30
census
165. Yet, it also provided for the possible extension of quotas to groups other than SCs 
and STs in its article 15 (4): « Nothing in this article [article 15, which states a general 
equality principle] (...) shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the 
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the 
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes »
166. At the same time, while the principle of 
preferential treatment was constitutionally sanctioned, the actual ratios, and even the 
definition of the relevant groups – in the case of these « other backward classes » –, were left 
for the executive to define, at the federal and at the state level.  
From a comparative point of view, one of the most striking features of the Indian 
predicament is the contrast between, on the one hand, the objective expansion of affirmative 
action benefits in university admissions and public employment
167 – although not in electoral 
representation – from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to the more numerous (52 
percent of the Indian population in 1980) and somewhat better-off backward castes
168 and, on 
the other hand, the long-standing acknowledgement of the irreducibly specific nature of the 
Untouchables’ condition, reflected in their noncontroversial designation as a caste for public 
policy purposes, in contrast to the protracted reluctance of the Indian authorities to use caste 
as the main criterion for identifying the other «  backward classes of citizens  » (OBCs) 
mentioned in article 15 (4)
169. 
At the federal executive level, that reluctance appeared most clearly in the 1950s, 
when the Nehru government, under the influence of the Marxist notion that class and class 
struggle was what ultimately mattered, repeatedly rejected the conclusions of the successively 
appointed « Backward Classes Commission », that all agreed in identifying membership in a 
lower caste as the most accurate proxy for economic and social disadvantage
170. At the 
judicial level, after a decade in which selection of groups to receive preferential treatment was 
left largely to state governments – with the result that the Supreme Court repeatedly struck 
down plans that seemed primarily to benefit politically powerful groups or that were based on 
traditional assumptions about caste-based prejudice without empirical research to show which 
groups were truly in greatest need –, the most important development occurred in 1961. In the 
Supreme Court decision Balaji v. State of Mysore rendered that year, the Court, while not 
                                                 
165 Other groups called « Scheduled Tribes » (STs) – defined by their supposedly aboriginal status, religious, 
linguistic and cultural differences, and geographic isolation – were also granted reserved seats. Article 330 of 
the Constitution set aside seats for SCs and STs in proportion to their numbers in the Lok Sabha (lower house of 
parliament), while article 32 did the same in the case of the state legislatures. Originally, all these reservations 
were time-bound and were to expire after a period of 10 years, but they were systematically extended. 
166 Our emphasis. 
167 In which case the reservations were not time-bound. 
168 Only in North India – where the members of the high castes made up one-fifth of the population on average – 
was the extension of affirmative action to the lower castes exclusively a post-independence phenomenon; in the 
South – where they were less than 5 percent –, the movement had already started well before the end of the 
1940s (Jaffrelot (2003)). That this development was actually an extension also stands in sharp contrast with the 
situation in the United States, where Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans were immediately and 
unreflectively included among the beneficiaries of affirmative action. (Another major difference is that in India, 
even though Article 15 (3) of the Constitution permits the state to make special provisions for women and 
children, affirmative action in university admissions and public employment was not extended to women). 
Finally, there has been a progression in the kind of reservations provided as well. Initially, reservations were 
provided for admission to schools and colleges, including engineering and medical schools; they were then 
provided for appointments to the state administrative services and, in the case of scheduled castes and tribes, to 
the central administrative services; eventually, they were extended to the entire public sector, though not to 
private employment (see Weiner (1993), at 44).  
169 Thus, since 1941 the category of caste has been withdrawn from the Indian census except as far as the 
Untouchables are concerned. 
170 Jaffrelot (2002).   31
objecting to the use of caste as a criterion for the identification of backwardness, held that it 
could not be the only criterion considered for that purpose. This holding is quite similar to the 
Bakke decision of the United States Supreme Court allowing race to be taken into account in 
university admissions as long as it was treated as just one among many potentially diversity-
enhancing features, to be weighed against all the other ones
171. Unlike the American court, 
however, the Indian judges did not find fault with the very principle of quotas for 
disadvantaged groups; they simply limited their extent by setting a ceiling of 50 percent on 
the number of positions reserved under Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution
172. 
The status quo prevailed until the early 1990s, when the Indian authorities finally 
changed course and accepted caste as the main relevant criterion for identifying the 
beneficiaries of affirmative action. The first step was the decision by the Janata Party 
government in August 1990 to implement the report that the Mandal Commission – named 
after its chairman, B.P. Mandal – had drafted 12 years earlier. Unlike in the U.S. Supreme 
Court 1978 Bakke decision – in which Justice Powell argued that the courts were not in a 
position to undertake the study in comparative victimology required in order to select the 
policy’s beneficiaries among all the groups who may feel that they should qualify for a 
special treatment of some kind
173 –, the report listed no less than 3,743 castes – representing 
52 percent of the country’s population – that it identified as forming these « Other Backward 
Classes », both Hindu and non-Hindu, eligible for « special provisions » under the Indian 
Constitution. Given that a proportional quota of 22.5 percent of government jobs and 
university spots had already been made for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes – 
who then represented 15 percent and 7.5 percent of the Indian population respectively –, in 
order to comply with the Balaji ruling and keep the total quantum of reservations below the 
50 percent limit, the Commission recommended a 27-percent reservation for the OBCs, even 
though their population was almost twice this figure. In other words, the OBCs were to 
receive only what was left of the 50 percent available for reservation after the SC and ST 
quotas had been set aside. Thus, the SCs and STs had their own separate reservations; they 
did not have to compete for reserved seats against the more populous and frequently more 
affluent and influential OBCs. In sharp contrast with the North American and South African 
affirmative action regimes, members of the group generally considered as the most 
disadvantaged are thus being granted some kind of preferential treatment also in relation to 
the policy’s other beneficiaries
174. 
                                                 
171 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, at 315-318.  
172 Balaji v. State of Mysore (All India Reporter 1963 SC 649). 
173 According to Powell, one should not ask « [the] courts (...) to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and 
consequent harm suffered by various minority groups » – and decide that « those whose societal injury [wa]s 
thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classifications... » 
(Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, at 296-297). For even if it were « politically feasible and 
socially desirable » to cast affirmative action as an admittedly unusual method exclusively designed to address 
the unique predicament of African Americans, the argument would inevitably rely on a « kind of variable 
sociological and political analysis » which « does not lie within the judicial competence » (Id., at 297), in part 
because the « subjective » judgments involved would have to be modified every now and then : « As these 
preferences began to have their desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were undone, new 
judicial rankings [taking into account the progress of the targeted group] would be necessary », thus introducing 
an element of discontinuity inherently incompatible with the alleged regularity of constitutional adjudication 
(Id., at 294, fn34, 297). 
174 Another distinctive feature of the Mandal report is its emphasis on the political virtues of affirmative action 
as an instrument for the empowerment of the lower castes: « ... We must recognise that an essential part of the 
battle against social backwardness is to be fought in the minds of the backward people. In India Government 
service has always been looked upon as a symbol of prestige and power. By increasing the representation of 
OBCs in government services, we give them an immediate feeling of participation in the governance of this 
country. When a backward class candidate becomes a Collector or a Superintendent of Police, the material   32
Then, in a November 16, 1992 decision upholding the government’s implementation 
of the Mandal report by a majority of 6 to 3, Indra Sawhney v. Union of India
175, the Supreme 
Court, while confirming that strictly economic criteria could not be the sole basis for 
identifying the Backward Class of citizens contemplated by the Constitution and removing all 
major hurdles in the implementation of the reservations for the OBCs, also pointed out the 
necessity of combining caste and class for ascertaining whether a specific individual ought to 
be eligible for affirmative action benefits. Thus, the court ruled that OBC membership only 
created a rebuttable presumption that a member needs preferential treatment
176. To address the 
concern that the benefits of reservation were not distributed evenly throughout each backward 
group but instead were monopolized by persons at the socioeconomic top of the group, it 
directed the government to adopt an economic means tests in order to screen out those 
advanced backward class members – the so-called «  creamy layer  » – who did not need 
government assistance
177, thus defusing a major issue of contention. As a result, the general 
procedure for determining individual eligibility is now as follows. First, since the unit that is 
tested for potential OBC status is a group that practices extensive endogamy, the person must 
be a member of such a group. Second, that endogamous group must be significantly below 
average levels of educational attainment. Third comes the means test, allowing for the 
exclusion of the « creamy layer ». However, this disaggregation of the group of potential 
affirmative action beneficiaries according to class criteria and the restriction that follows, 
often discussed but never implemented in the United States, apply only to the OBCs. In this 
respect as well, members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes benefit from a kind of 
preferential treatment – insofar as they remain out of reach of this newly enforced trimming 
process
178. 
  Last but not least, aside from the – rather moderate – effects of reservation policies on 
the economic and educational predicament of low-and-scheduled caste members
179, support 
for these policies in the face of upper-caste resistance has become a highly effective device 
for political mobilization. Even after the Sawhney decision, when it became reasonably clear 
that such resistance would subside, politicians have largely succeeded in organizing members 
of their caste community around the demand for inclusion on the list of those to be given 
preferences. In short, backwardness has become a vested interest, with support for 
                                                                                                                                                         
benefits accruing from his position are limited to the members of his family only. But the psychological spin off 
of this phenomenon is tremendous; the entire community of that backward class candidate feels socially 
elevated. Even when no tangible benefits flow to the community at large, the feeling that now it has its ‘own 
man’ in the ‘corridors of power’ acts as morale booster » (in Preet Hooda (1985), at 185). 
175 Indra Sawhney  v. Union of India, All Indian Reporter 1993 S.C. 477 (India). 
176 Id, at 558-560. 
177 Id. 
178 Sawhney also overruled a 1957 Supreme Court decision – General Manger v. Rangachari (A.I.R. 1962, S.C. 
36) – that had upheld the practice of extending reservation of posts to cover promotions under departmental 
examinations. Thus, as far as jobs are concerned, reservations are now confined to initial appointment only, on 
the assumption that once hired, members of the backward classes can compete and earn promotions on merit as 
do other public employees. Finally, the judgment exempted from reservations appointments to certain high-skill 
positions, for example, defense personnel, medical scientists and university professors. 
179 Higher education, in particular, is not a practical possibility for all those who are officially eligible for 
affirmative action benefits. In that field, such benefits are really available only to those who can supplement 
them with other complementary inputs, including many years of prior education. Thus, unused reservations have 
been common: a 1977-78 survey showed that less than half the university places set aside for members of the 
scheduled castes or scheduled tribes were in fact filled; a later survey of medical schools in 1979-1980 and in 
1980-1981 showed that only 23 out of the 77 institutions included in the sample had full utilization of their 
quotas for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe students, while 10 did not have a single student in either category 
(Sowell (1990), at 97). The same goes for high-skill positions in the civil service: as a general matter, 
untouchables are most substantially represented in the lowest levels of government employment.   33
reservations working like a litmus test for low-and scheduled caste voters
180. While until the 
implementation of the Mandal recommendations reservation policy varied across states and 
remained mostly a state-level issue, in the 1990s the primary result of that policy has been to 
bifurcate the electorate into two national coalitions – the targeted and the nontargeted –, thus 
joining groups with potentially divergent interests – SCs and STs on the one hand, OBCs on 
the other hand – against those whose interests were even further away on that single 
dimension. So far, the creation of this new political arithmetic remains the most significant 
consequence of affirmative action in India, albeit an unintended one. Perhaps a more 
systematically comparative analysis of affirmative action on a global scale should thus focus 






As a general matter, the consequences of affirmative action can be examined from at 
least two different perspectives. One may consider either the policy’s immediate quantifiable 
objectives – did it entail an increase in the proportion of jobs, public contracts and seats at 
selective universities obtained by the targeted groups over a period of time, and to what 
extent? – or its contribution towards the ultimate goal of facilitating the integration of 
minority groups in society at large, beyond the distribution of these specific resources. 
Obviously, that second goal is not always present to the same degree: in India and Malaysia, 
for instance, reducing the inequality in the distribution of social goods between the different 
groups involved is clearly not conceived as partaking of the more utopian project of 
abolishing group boundaries within the nation-state – or even of promoting greater school or 
residential integration in the long run. Giving communities their proportional share of some – 
admittedly important – social benefits is not supposed to lead to the blurring of the lines that 
keep them separate from each other in other, non-allocative spheres. In the United States and 
in France, on the other hand, the connection between policies equalizing patterns of economic 
distribution and the ideal of societal integration is a much stronger one. 
This distinction is relevant to the key question of how to define the preconceived 
social outcome the attainment of which would justify the eventual termination of affirmative 
action programs. In the first case – that of India and Malaysia –, the proportionality criterion 
provides an obvious « focal point »
181 to resolve controversy, generally acknowledged as 
such. In the second case – that of the United States –, proportional representation is 
emphatically rejected as a distributive principle, even though it arguably operates covertly at 
the policymaking level, by providing the benchmark against which « discrepancies » and « 
deficiencies » will be identified and compensated for. Yet, at the end of the day, one may 
argue that the ultimate goal of affirmative action will be reached only when it will not occur 
to anyone to check on the percentage of African American students or employees anymore. 
For if the reference to eye-color – as the prototypical example of a physical characteristic as 
non-salient as race should eventually become, according to the color-blind ideal – is such a 
familiar feature of the affirmative action debate
182, it is actually not so much because we 
know for sure that there is no correlation whatsoever between that socially unimportant trait 
and the position held by individuals in the economic and occupational hierarchy, than because 
no one would even think of undertaking an empirical investigation designed to find out. In 
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this respect, one of the many paradoxes of affirmative action precisely lies in this attempt to 
organize the disappearance of its own conditions of possibility. However, while the objective 
of special treatment for members of disadvantaged groups is to make the need for that special 
treatment disappear as rapidly as possible, the political reality, in the United States and 
elsewhere, is that once preferences are established, they are almost impossible to dismantle. 
Although affirmative action policies have almost always been rationalized as a temporary 
remedy, they tend to «become permanent in a democratic society, where benefits once given 
cannot be withdrawn»
183. 
  Not only do affirmative action programs persist regardless of the conditions that ought 
to trigger their elimination over time
184; they have also tended to expand in scope, either 
embracing more groups or spreading to wider realms for the same groups, or both. Thus, in 
the United States, affirmative action almost immediately spread from one unquestionably 
oppressed group (native-born blacks) outward to other groups with a lesser claim to 
exceptional treatment, including other ethnoracial minorities (most of whom were recent 
immigrants), and women. It was the exceptional experience of African Americans and the 
urgently felt need to correct it that permitted the principle of affirmative action to be 
(imperfectly) legitimized in the first place and subsequently to be picked up by other groups 
who would not have been able to make the original claim. Similarly, in India, affirmative 
action policies have evolved from quotas for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes only to 
sweeping national-and state-level programs that cover more than one-half the Indian 
population in representation, higher education, and government employment. Heavily 
criticized as it was, this expansion of the affirmative action regime proved irresistible 
nonetheless, at least in these two – otherwise sharply distinct – contexts. But if « the group 
whose history provides the moral rationale for initiating preferential policies is unlikely to 
remain the sole group preferred in a multi-ethnic society (...), the real issue then becomes : 
What are the likely consequences of an enduring policy of group preferences for the whole 
range of groups that are likely to get them ? The (...) issue is then no longer whether group A 
or B deserves contemporary preferences, but whether groups C, D, E, etc. also deserve such 
preferences especially if these latter groups are larger, more educated, or otherwise better 
positioned to use the preferences, thereby diluting or destroying the value of preferences for 
group A or B, who may have stronger moral claims or more urgent social needs »
185. 
  Last but not least, another dimension along which to assess these affirmative action 
regimes is their degree of internal differentiation. Most often than not, that differentiation is 
simply nonexistent. Thus, in Malaysia, all Malay individuals are potentially eligible for 
preferential treatment over individuals of Chinese extraction. In South Africa, the Black 
Management Forum’s demand that the implementation of affirmative action programs take 
into account objective inequalities in the extent of the discrimination suffered by the « 
designated groups » during the Apartheid era was essentially ignored. In the United States, 
this structural tendency to avoid establishing any official hierarchy of disadvantage within the 
population of affirmative action beneficiaries was even reinforced by the « juridicialization of 
politics »
186 characteristic of the American public sphere. For while « the legislative 
authority… is not bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach…, 
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is free to recognize degrees of harm… and… may confine its restrictions to those classes of 
cases where the need is deemed to be clearest »
187, judges cannot openly indulge in such « 
sociological and political» assessments
188 – and judges happen to be those upon whom the 
fate of affirmative action depends. Hence their focus on the diversity argument which, faulty 
as it is, has at least the virtue of not forcing them to conspicuously encroach upon the 
province of the legislator. While Supreme Court decisions do confer additional legitimacy 
upon affirmative action – in the United States and in India
189 –, they may thus have the 
negative side effect of entrenching the policy’s overinclusiveness.
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